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I. INTRODUCTION
For over a decade, the problem of effectively controlling water pollution 
from agricultural drainage on the west side of California's San Joaquin Valley 
has challenged and frustrated regulators, farmers, and environmentalists alike. 
Drainage discharges have caused, and continue to cause, significant 
environmental damage to one of California's major river systems, as well as to 
extensive portions of the Central Valley wetlands that are the backbone of the 
Pacific Flyway. Although there exists a broad consensus that the solution to this 
problem lies in improved irrigation efficient at the individual farm level, an 
effective method to accomplish this goal has not been identified. 
In several important respects, problems associated with agricultural 
pollution in the San Joaquin Valley are representative of a nationwide challenge. 
Agricultural drainage is, in regulatory language, a "nonpoint source" of water 
pollution. In contrast to "point source" pollution—the readily identified and 
monitored discharges from individual factors and water treatment plants—
"nonpoint source" pollution includes runoff from agriculture, logging, 
construction, urban development, and mining. Even though pollution from 
these sources—particularly agricultural pollution—is now known to be the 
principal cause of contamination in lakes, rivers, and streams nationwide, little 
progress has been made in creating effective programs to control it. This is due 
in large part to the perceived enormity and inefficiency of the regulatory task. 
Characteristic of many nonpoint source pollution problems, agricultural runoff 
is comprised of countless independent sources, each of which must be 
addressed if an overall program of pollution control is to be successful. 
Indeed, traditional methods of regulation of seemed inappropriate to 
industries such as agriculture because of the sheer number and diversity of 
sources. Issuance of individual permits that limit the amount of pollutants that 
each farm may discharge has been considered too cumbersome a program to 
administer, and this approach thus far has been rejected by federal, state, and 
local legislatures and regulatory agencies. One the other hand, requiring framers 
to adopt "Best Management Practices," a regulatory approach that avoids the 
need for individual permits by requiring all sources to use a specified pollution-
control technology, would present its own set of shortcomings when applied to 
a highly diverse group of individual farms. This combination of factors—a 
significant, uncontrolled source of environmental pollution and imperfect tools 
for regulating it—has led policymakers to seek to identify new, more workable 
strategies to control agricultural pollution. 
At the same time, private sector concerns over regulatory costs and 
intervention in business decisions have generated a growing interest in incentive-
based pollution control programs. The theoretical advantages of these programs—
cost-effective pollution control, maximum flexibility to the regulated community, 
and reduced informational and bureaucratic requirements for regulators—have 
been widely discussed in the policy literature. Yet incentives have rarely, if ever, been 
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given more than cursory consideration as the primary means of pollution control 
where pollution problems are attributable solely to nonpoint sources. 
The agricultural drainage crisis in the Grasslands region of California's 
Central Valley provides an excellent case study for testing the advantages and 
disadvantages of both incentive-based programs and traditional regulatory 
programs. The crux of the problem in the Grasslands is representative of 
agricultural pollution problems generally. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of 
sources must be made accountable for the pollution they generate. Yet, these 
sources traditionally have resisted regulation out of concern that they will lose 
control of their farming operations to state or federal regulators and that 
mandates to reduce drainage would be unduly expensive. Thus, decentralized 
decision-making and cost-effectiveness are key elements to any reform effort. 
Indeed, cost is particularly important in the Grasslands region, where over 50 
percent of employment in the affected counties is farm-related.1 
The Grasslands region is particularly suited to this type of approach to pollution 
control because the foundation for analysis has already been laid. The nature of the 
pollution problem is understood; the pollution sources, while numerous, have been 
identified; and options for controlling drainage discharges at the farm level are 
available and generally affordable. In addition, many of the legal and institutional 
mechanisms necessary for implementing a regulator solution already exist. 
Above all, the crisis in the Grasslands demands attention. Agricultural 
pollution in the Grasslands region has continued unabated for years, 
threatening ecosystems that provide critical remnant habitats for the many fish 
and wildlife species in the region. 
This study examines the feasibility of using economic incentives to control 
pollution from irrigated agriculture in the Grasslands. In the process, it presents 
a model for moving from theoretical discussion of new regulator strategies to 
practical applications. While the primary result of the study is a specific 
proposal for a regulatory system in the Grasslands, the analytic model itself is 
just as important. Parts or all of it may be useful in any region where agricultural 
or other nonpoint source pollution problems persist. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM OF NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION 
A. Nonpoint Source Pollution: The National Context
Two decades ago, the nation embarked on an ambitious agenda to restore 
the quality of water in our rivers, lakes, and estuaries. The primary objective of 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 19722—which from the 
1. S. ARCHIBALD, ECONOMIC PROFILE OF AGRICULTURE IN THE WESTSIDE OF THE SAN 
JOAQUIN VALLEY (1990). 
2. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1387 (1986)
(hereinafter “Clean Water Act” or “CWA”). 
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basis of the modern CWA—was "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, 
and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."3 Although considerable 
improvements in water quality have been achieved to date, many surface waters 
in the United States still do not support designated uses. The primary cause of 
these continuing water quality problems is pollution from nonpoint sources.4 
Agricultural runoff is the single largest contributor to nonpoint source 
pollution and is the primary source of all water pollution in quality-impaired 
rivers, lakes, and streams.5 In the West, where approximately 50 million acres of 
land are devoted to irrigated agriculture,6 low river flows can exacerbate the 
problem. In these relatively arid environments, agricultural runoff and drainage 
often provide a significant proportion of river flows and may dominated flows 
during periods of drought and seasonal low flows. 
Agricultural drainage poses a direct threat to fish and wildlife habitats and 
the species that depend on them. In a recent study, the United States Fish and 
Wildlife Service (hereinafter "FWS") documented extensive damage to aquatic 
habitats due to toxic concentrations of pollutants in surface and subsurface 
drainage discharges from irrigated lands.7 Significantly, agricultural return flows 
are the most common source of pollution of nation wildlife refuges.8 Many 
refuges depend on agricultural drainage flows for some portion of their water 
supplies, and many areas that receive contaminated drainage water serve as 
3. Id. § 101(a). 
4. According to a recent Environmental Protection Agency report to Congress: Nonpoint 
source pollution problems exist in every state and extend to every type of waterbody.  Each 
category of nonpoint sources generates a broad range of pollutants in varying concentrations.  
Nonpoint sources have caused severe damage to aquatic communities nationwide and also pose 
risks for human health where fish, shellfish, or drinking water are contaminated.  U.S. 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF WATER, MANAGING NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION: FINAL 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SECTION 319 OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT (1992) (hereinafter “EPA REPORT”). 
5. Id. In a survey of nonpoint source assessment data provided by states, the EPA found
agricultural runoff to be the largest source of pollution in rivers and streams nationwide (accounting 
for the pollution in 41% of rivers mileage reported as quality-impaired). In the western states, 
rangeland and irrigated cropland cause pollution in 99.5% and 89%,  respectively, of impaired river 
mileage. In the West, agriculture is also the largest source of pollution in lakes with irrigated 
agriculture accounting for more than 40% of the lake acreage reported as impaired. 
6. IRRIGATION JOURNAL (1993). 
7. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, AN OVERVIEW OF IRRIGATION DRAINWATER 
TECHNIQUES, IMPACTS ON FISH AND WILDLIFE RESOURCES, AND MANAGEMENT OPTIONS (1992) 
(hereinafter “USFWS OVERVIEW”). The primary constituents of concern include naturally 
occurring trace elements e.g., selenium, boron, molybdenum, and salts) as well as 
pesticides, herbicides, and other chemicals. 
8. The EPA attributes 81% of the pollution in California wetlands to agriculture,
with indications that most of the wetland acreage in California is contaminated by 
agricultural drainage. EPA REPORT, supra note 4. 
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habitat to one or more federally listened endangered or threatened species. 
Adverse effects on waterfowl populations include reduced reproductive success 
and survival of young birds.9 While less information is available about the effects 
of agricultural drainage on species other than waterfowl, a National Fishery 
Survey conducted by the United States Environmental Protection Agency 
(hereinafter "EPA") and FWS found that agricultural runoff adversely affected fish 
populations in 29% of the waters studied.10 
One reason that nonpoint sources, including irrigated agriculture, are 
such a prominent cause of continuing pollution is that the Clean Water Act has 
focused regulatory efforts and expenditures almost exclusively on municipal and 
industrial point sources. Until the Act was amended in 1987, the primary 
program for addressing nonpoint source pollution was the requirement of 
section 208 that the states develop comprehensive water quality management 
plans.11 The "208 Plans" were largely ineffective, however, because federal law 
does not require that they be implemented. 
Another, less obvious reason that nonpoint sources have been overlooked is 
the regulatory bias embodied in the CWA. Since 1972, technology-drive effluent 
standards have been the principal tool for controlling pollution. In 1987, Congress 
amended the Act to emphasize pollution control requirements based on water 
quality,12 thereby increasing the pressure on states and localities to regulate the 
dischargers responsible for most of the pollution—including nonpoint sources. 
The CWA now requires states to identify waters that, "without additional 
action to control nonpoint sources of pollution, cannot reasonably be expected 
to attain or maintain applicable water quality standards or the goals and 
requirements of the Act."13 It also directs each State to identify specific 
categories and subcategories of nonpoint sources as part of this process and, 
for each such source, to develop a detailed management plan to address the 
pollution problem, including both regulator and non-regulatory programs.14 In 
addition, nonpoint sources must be factored into the calculations that allocate 
pollution reduction responsibilities among dischargers for each water body that 
does not meet water quality standards.15 
9. See, e.g., J.P. Skorupa & H.M. Ohlendorf, Contaminants in Drainage Water and Avian Risk Thresholds, in 
ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT OF WATER AND DRAINAGE IN AGRICULTURE (A. Dinar et al. eds., 1991). 
10. Survey cited in USFWS OVERVIEW, supra note 7.
11. Clean Water Act § 208. 
12. Id. § 302(a). 
13. Id. § 319(a)(1). 
14. Id.
15. Section 303 (d)(1)(c) of the CWA requires that, for each pollutant criterion violated, 
states calculate a “total maximum daily load” (hereinafter “TMDL”) of pollutants “at a level 
necessary to implement the applicable water quality standards with seasonal variations and a 
margin of safety which takes into account any lock of knowledge concerning the relationship 
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Although this emphasis on water quality-based regulation has turned the 
spotlight on nonpoint source pollution, the CWA still does not require sates to 
implement nonpoint source regulatory programs. Nor does it authorize the EPA 
to promulgate a federal program in the absence of an adequate state program.16 
In sum, while Congress has expressed the clear intent to address nonpoint 
source pollution,17 the language of the CWA fails to ensure effective nonpoint 
source pollution control.18 
The need to improve the federal legal and policy structure for controlling 
nonpoint source pollution, particularly agricultural pollution, is now widely 
recognized. In some watersheds, nonpoint source dischargers produce most of 
the pollution. Yet, these sources have not invested in pollution control and are 
not required to take even the most affordable steps to decrease discharges. At 
the same time, point source dischargers in the same watershed generate 
significantly less pollution, having substantially reduced their discharges and 
are now being required to invest in pollution control measures with relatively 
between effluent limitations and water quality.” Id. § 303 (d)(1)(c). States must incorporate 
these allocations into their “continuing planning process” under section 303(e) of the CWA. 
The EPA is required to review state TMDLs and to promulgate a federal TMDL where a state 
TMDL is inadequate. Id. 303(d)(2). 
16. See E. Bartfeld, Point-Nonpoint Source Trading: Looking Beyond Potential Cost
Savings, 23 ENVTL. L. 43 (1993) P. THOMPSON, RUNOFF: A GUIDE TO STATE AND LOCAL CONTROL 
OF NONPOINT SOURCE WATER POLLUTION (1989). The CWA, even as amended in 1987, also 
lacks adequate incentives to encourage states to implement nonpoint source 
programs. Prior to 1987, EPA did not provide grants to state or local nonpoint source 
management programs; in 1987 Congress authorized $400 million in nonpoint source 
funding for a five-year period. See also EPA REPORT, supra note 4. Sanctions for 
noncompliance with nonpoint source requirements also appear inadequate. While EPA  
may disapprove a state management plan, the only consequence to the state is 
ineligibility for section 319 funds. Clean Water Act § 319(h). 
17. “It is the national policy that programs for the control of nonpoint source of
pollution be developed and implemented in an expeditious manner so as to enable the 
goals of this Act to be met through the control of both point and nonpoint sources of 
pollutions.” Clean Water Act § 101(a)(7). 
18. Starting in the 1970’s, EPA sought to redefine “point source: to exclude non-
industrial discharges such as farm and logging ditches, arguing that it was impractical and 
unrealistic to set technology-based requirements on those sources. In 1977, Congress 
categorically exempted irrigation return flows from the definition of point sources. In 1987, 
Congress extended the agricultural exemption to included agricultural storm water discharges, 
See John. H. Davidson, Little Waters: The Relationship Between Water Pollution and Agricultural Drainage, 
17 ENVTL. L. REP. 89 (1987).  Other areas of federal policy also provide special exemptions and 
subsides to irrigated agriculture, which makes the task of effectively regulating agricultural 
water pollution more difficult.  Subsidized water prices and commodity price support programs 
give farmers little incentive to use resources more efficiently. 
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high marginal costs. Because of this imbalance, point source dischargers are 
seeking relief from these requirements and are urging the states and the federal 
government to begin to regulate nonpoint sources. 
Environmental interests, as well as state and local agencies responsible 
for water pollution control, also recognize the importance of controlling 
nonpoint sources of pollution, agricultural sources.19 
The 103rd Congress debated significant amendments to the nonpoint 
source provisions of the CWA.20 Recent changes in other federal laws also 
demonstrate the growing interest in nonpoint source regulation. For example, 
the Coastal Zone Management Act was amended in 1990 to require certain 
states to develop a Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program.21 The Central 
Valley Project Improvement Act, enacted in 1992, contains a number of 
significant reform measures for federal water management in California. These 
include requirements that water districts and individuals who use federally 
supplied water assume responsibility for control and management of drainage 
discharges generated within their respective boundaries in order to comply with 
all state and federal water quality standards.22 
B. The Grasslands: A Test Case for Nonpoint Source Pollution Control 
On the west side of the San Joaquin Valley, in a 93,000-acre region known as the 
Grasslands region (Figure 1), subsurface drainage from irrigated agriculture contains 
high concentrations of trace elements and salts.23 These elements occur naturally in 
the area's soils but pose problems when they are mobilized and transported by 
irrigation water. Several contaminants (notably selenium, boron, arsenic, and 
molybdenum) are of particular concern because of their potential harm to fish and 
wildlife, or because of their adverse effects on agricultural productivity in areas 
19. As one expert recently state, “Although urban development, marinas, dam building,
and the like contribute to nonpoint source pollution, agriculture is seen by many people as the 
most significant source; so it is not a question of water agriculture will be singled out—but how.” 
Susan Offutt, Executive Director of the Board of Agriculture, National Academy of Sciences, 
Remarks at the Conference o Rural Nonpoint Source Pollution in the Upper Midwest (March 17, 
1993), cited in NONPOINT SOURCE NEWS-NOTES, June/July 1993, at 23. 
20. E.g., S. 1114 (Sen. Baucus, D-MT; Sen. Chafee, R-RI) and H.R. 3948 (Rep. Mineta, D-CA). 
21. Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments of 1990, 16 U.S.C. § 1455b
(1993 Supp.). 
22. Central Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, Title XXXIV, §
3405(c) 106 Stat. 4706 (1992) (hereinafter “CVPIA.”) 
23. Saline soils occur naturally as a result of the arid climate. For centuries, ephemeral and 
intermittent streams originating in the Coast Range have carried dissolved salts, trace elements, and 
sediments out across the plain, often spreading out, drying up, and depositing their loads of 
dissolved solids in soils of the alluvial fans. In addition, sediment transport and deposition have 
caused substantial movement of trace element loads to lower elevations. 
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downstream. Toxic concentrations of trace elements in drainage discharges also pose 
a threat to public health by contaminating game species. 
Widespread irrigation of the west side San Joaquin Valley's saline soils 
requires importation of water into the region on a large scale and a program to 
"leach" the salts out of the soils and drain the lands of excess water following 
the irrigation crops. Without drainage facilities to carry away excess water and 
salt, irrigation would lead to widespread "waterlogging" of clay soils, trapping 
dissolved salts and trace elements within the root zone. 
In the 1960s, farmers on the west side of the San Joaquin Valley began to 
install subsurface drains and drainage canals to collect, transport, and dispose 
of saline drainage water. The long-term plan, conceived as a partnership among 
state, federal, and farming interests, was to construct a 188 mile concrete drain 
in the trough of the San Joaquin Valley to carry drainage water to the 
Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta.24 Construction of  
24. Congress decided that the federal irrigation project planned for the region
would be contingent upon the installation of drainage facilities.  The San Luis Unit of 
the Central Valley Project (hereinafter CVP) which serves the Grasslands, was 
authorized in 1960. San Luis Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-488, 74, Stat. 156 (1960). 
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a segment of this San Luis Drain began in 1968 and included a regulating 
reservoir in the Kesterson National Wildlife Refuge. When construction of the 
San Luis Drain was halted in the mid-1970s because of financial and political 
problems Kesterson Reservoir became its terminus. 
By 1983, approximately 7,000 acre-feet25 of drainage, primarily from 
subsurface drains in the Westlands Water District, was being delivered to 
Kesterson each year. Shortly thereafter, biologists from the FWS discovered 
unusually high rates of embryonic deaths and deformities among birds in the 
area. Of the nests under study at Kesterson, almost 20 percent contained 
deformed birds, and over 40 percent contained at least one dead embryo.26 Only 
one species of fish, the hardy gambusia (mosquito fish), could be found. The 
biologists attributed these shocking findings to elevated concentrations of 
selenium27 present in subsurface agricultural drainage water in the San Luis 
Drain. Selenium has accumulated in invertebrates and plants in the food chain, 
leaded to severe effects on the birds that fed on them. 
The discovery of the effects of selenium in agricultural drainage at 
Kesterson was serendipitous. Several factors converged to allow researches to 
detect its adverse effects. Kesterson was a federally protected national wildlife 
refuge, and biologists were frequently working in the field. Documentation of 
actual deaths and deformities might not have occurred in an unprotected area. 
Moreover, the effects of selenium toxicity were clearly observable in young birds, 
while sublethal effects in adult birds would have been difficult to identify. In 
addition, Kesterson was located in a closed basin with no other water source, 
which accelerated the rate of accumulation of selenium and other elements to 
harmful levels. Where drainage is disposed of in open, flowing water bodies, the 
effects of selenium are far more difficult to detect. 
In 1986, The California State Water Resources Control Board ordered the 
United States to close the San Luis Drain and Kesterson Reservoir. Closer of 
these facilities did not resolve the problems of managing and disposing of 
contaminated agricultural drainage, however, and selenium in drainage 
25. An acre-foot of water, approximately 326,000 gallons, is enough water to
cover one acre of land one feet deep and to meet the average annual (domestic) water 
needs of a family of five. 
26. H.M. Ohlendorf et al., Embryonic Mortality and Abnormalities of Aquatic Birds:
Apparent Impacts by Selenium From Irrigation Drainwater, 51 THE SCIENCE OF THE TOTAL 
ENVIRONMENT 49 (1986). For Additional information, see H.M. Ohlendorf et al., Selenium 
Toxicosis in Wild Aquatic Birds, 24 JOURNAL OF TOXICOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 67 
(1988);  D.J. Hoffman & G. Heinz, Embryotoxic and Teratogenic Effects of Selenium in the Diet of 
Mallards, 24 JOURNAL OF TOXICOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH 477 (1988);  Skorupa & 
Ohlendorf, supra note 9. 
27. Selenium is essential to human and animal health in small quantities, but it
can be toxic when it is ingested in large quantities, leading to reduced reproduction, 
reduced survival, reduced growth and deformities in fish and wildlife species. 
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continues to threaten biological resources in the San Joaquin Valley. Much of 
the agricultural drainage in the region now flows directly into the San Joaquin 
River. Elsewhere in the San Joaquin Valley, evaporation ponds are still widely 
used for drainage disposal. The ponds are known to attract migratory waterfowl 
and other aquatic birds, posing a significant risk to these populations. Currently, 
there are approximately 7,000 acres of evaporation ponds in the San Joaquin 
Valley; plans have been made to build between 10,000 and 20,000 additional 
acres of ponds.28 
Before the closure of Kesterson, private wetlands in the Grassland Water 
District had been receiving as much as 29,000 acre-feet of similarly 
contaminated drainage as a water supply for duck habitat.29 Because the 
drainage water was mixed with relatively clean water in the Grasslands 
wetlands, contamination was not as severe as at Kesterson. In 1985, following 
the discoveries at Kesterson, the Grasslands Water District stopped using the 
drainage water and, through a series of temporary conveyances, it was routed to 
the San Joaquin River. Since that time, the river consistently has exceeded 
selenium standards. Resulting damage to fish populations has been difficult to 
detect, however, due to a lack of baseline information.30 
In response to the sudden degradation of the San Joaquin River and the 
continuing risk of the wetlands, the California State Water Resources Control Board 
sponsored a two-year study of the agricultural drainage problem in the Grasslands 
region.31 Searching for practical solutions, state and regional officials found that most 
28. SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY DRAINAGE PROGRAM, FISH AND WILDLIFE RESOURCES AND
AGRICULTURAL DRAINAGE IN THE SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY, CALIFORNIA (1990). 
29. During the 1970s and 1980s until the disaster at Kesterson Reservoir, up to
50% of the water used in wildlife areas in the Grasslands region consisted of 
agricultural drainage and other “surplus” waters. Id. 
30. M.K. Saiki et al., Preliminary Assessment of the Effects of Selenium in Agricultural
drainage on Fish in the San Joaquin Valley, in ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT OF WATER AND
DRAINAGE IN AGRICULTURE. (A. Dinar et al. eds., 1991). For additional information on 
elevated concentrations of trace elements in fish tissues from the area, see M.K. Saiki, 
Selenium and other Trace Elements in Fish Stock from the San Joaquin Valley and Suisun Bay, in 
SYMPOSIUM IV: SELENIUM AND AGRICULTURAL DRAINAGE (1985); M.K. Saiki & T.W. May, Trace 
Element Residues in Bluegills and Common Carp From the Lower San Joaquin River, California, and 
its Tributaries, 74 THE SCIENCE OF THE TOTAL ENVIRONMENT 199 (1988).  
In December of 1994, Judge Oliver W. Wanger of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of California ruled that the Bureau of Reclamation is required by the San 
Luis Act to complete the San Luis Drain. Judge Wanger issued a permanent injunction that 
compels the United States to “take all reasonable and necessary actions to apply for a 
discharge permit for the...drain.” Summer Peck Ranch, Inc. v. Bureau of Reclamation, Nos. 
CV-F-91-048 OWW & CV-F-88-634 OWW, slip op. at 47 (E.D. Cal. 1994). 
31. STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, REGULATION OF AGRICULTURAL DRAINAGE 
TO THE SAN JOAQUIN RIVER (1987) (hereinafter “SWRCB Report”). 
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o the drainage problem could be solved affordably by using readily available, more
efficient irrigation methods to reduce the amount of drainage produced. 
The findings of the state report were confirmed and supplemented in 1990 
by the conclusions of a $50 million study undertaken by the joint federal-state 
San Joaquin Valley Drainage Program (hereinafter "SJVDP"). The SJVDP also 
produced a detailed management plan32 based on the same fundamental 
recommendations put forward by the state study: First, to decrease the amount 
of drainage generated, growers in the religion must improve irrigation efficiency 
and selectively retire (i.e. permanently fallow) highly contaminated farmland. 
Second, they must recycle and dispose of strictly limited quantities of drainage. 
Third, farmers must employ technological "fixes," as necessary, to ameliorate 
the remaining problem. 
While SJVDP's management plan was widely accepted by government agencies, 
the agricultural community, and the public, its recommendations have not yet been 
implemented. For example, the RWQCB neither has set specific limits on drainage 
discharges to the San Joaquin River nor has enforced any other requirements for 
drainage reduction or land retirement. Instead, it has relied solely upon voluntary 
cooperation by water districts and farmers to limit drainage discharges, even though 
California law provides ample authority to regulate agricultural pollution.33 To date, 
this voluntary approach has failed to ensure that water quality objectives are met in 
the river and appears unlikely to do so in the future. 
C. A New Look At Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollution Control
An important first step in controlling nonpoint source is to dispel the 
misperception that nonpoint source pollution is necessarily diffuse and 
therefore difficult or impossible to manage or regulate. This perception is 
embodied in the language of the CWA34 and has resulted in an approach to 
nonpoint source control, both by EPA and the states, that is limited to planning 
and voluntary implementation of pollution abatement measures. 
In fact, many categories of nonpoint source pollution are comprised of 
numerous individual sources that can be identified and monitors. This is 
particularly true in the case of irrigated agriculture where many engineered 
ditches, canals, and drains convey drainage waters to an ultimate point of 
discharge. These conveyances make the sources of pollution identifiable. 
Moreover, the quantity of drainage generated is a direct function of water 
32. SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY DRAINAGE PROGRAM, A MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR AGRICULTURAL 
SUBSURFACE DRAINAGE AND RELATED PROBLEMS ON THE WESTSIDE SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY: FINAL 
REPORT (1990) (hereinafter “DRAINAGE PROGRAM FINAL REPORT”). 
33. See discussion infra Part V.
34. See Clean Water Act §§ 402(l)(1) & 502(14) (categorical exemptions for
discharges of irrigation return flow from the NPDES permit system and from the 
definition of point source, respectively). 
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application and water use efficiency, both of which can be measured and 
controlled. 
The real challenge of controlling agricultural nonpoint source pollution is 
to design an approach that is sufficiently flexible to address myriad individual 
scores, yet still achieves the environmental goals. Flexibility is best achieved 
through a decentralized decision-making process so that framers can adapt 
control technologies to site-specific conditions. In this way, framers also will be 
able to minimize the cost of pollution control. The desire for flexibility, however, 
cannot override the need to ensure that the program achieves water quality 
goals. Accordingly, institutional mechanism must be established to shift 
responsibility for pollution control to the farmers, just as point source 
dischargers are accountable for their discharges. Finding a method to provide 
this accountability in a practical way has been the missing link in nonpoint 
source pollution control. 
1. Best Management Practices
To date, direct regulation of agricultural sources generally has been based on 
Best Management Practices (hereinafter "BMPs").35 BMPs usually prescribe the use of 
specific technologies or management measures designed to decreases pollution from 
runoff. In irrigated agriculture, for example, BMPs may consist of particular irrigation 
technologies and land management practices, such as land leveling. In rarer cases, 
BMPS have specified the goals to be achieved—for example, reduced erosion—rather 
than the practices to be used. In these cases, BMPs have established general goals 
instead of quantitative effluent limits.36 
While BMPs are the customary tool, there are two reasons why 
establishment of BMPs is not necessarily the optimal method for controlling 
agricultural pollution. First, BMPS tend to be general. Therefore, while they may 
be relevant to a broad range of conditions, they do not impose sufficient 
accountability on the discharger. Moreover, the amount of pollution reduction 
that will be achieved is difficult to predict. This undermines the potential for 
effective and enforceable environmental improvement. Even in cases were 
35. This also is true for voluntary pollution control programs for agriculture.
California’s Nonpoint Source Management Plan, for example, encourages the use of 
BMPs. STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD (DIVISION OF WATER QUALITY, NONPOINT 
SOURCE PROGRAM), NONPOINT SOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN (1988). 
36. The EPA’s Guidance for Implementation of the Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments of
1990, distinguishes between :management measures,” which state a performance goal in non-
quantitative terms, and “management practices,” which may be used to achieve these goals. The 
guidance does not preclude states from identifying alternative management measures, including 
market-based approaches such as trading of pollution credits. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AGENCY & U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, COASTAL NONPOINT POLLUTION CONTROL PROGRAM—
PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT AND APPROVAL GUIDANCE (1991). 
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relatively fine-tuned BMPs can be prescribed, variations in site-specific physical 
conditions (e.g. soil type, soil uniformity, depth to groundwater) will result in 
different levels of performance at different locations for a given BMP. 
Second, BMPs do not account for differences in pollution-control costs 
among farms. Thus, while a given irrigation technology or management practice 
may be well-suited for one farm, it might not be the most cost-effective 
approach for another, with the result that total pollution-control costs for the 
regulated farm community are higher than necessary. As with the physical 
differences among farms, this economic heterogeneity makes the process of 
defining appropriate BMPs time-consuming and expensive. 
2. Incentive-Based Programs
Awareness of the potential shortcomings of BMPS, coupled with the 
growing concerns over the costs of environmental regulation, have fueled a 
strong interest in alternative approaches to pollution control such as economic 
incentives.37 The chief appeal of economic incentives over traditional regulatory 
approaches is the potential cost savings to the regulated agricultural 
community and to society as a whole.38 Economic incentives communicate a 
"price" of pollution, which reflects the cost of environmental damage (or, 
alternatively, the value of the environmental resources at risk). In this way, 
incentive programs shift the costs of polluting to the polluters. As a result, each 
farmer is encouraged to see out technologies or practices to reduce pollution 
and thereby to minimize the costs of doing business. 
Among economic incentives, market-based programs provide the greatest 
potential for cost savings, because they provide the greatest flexibility for 
farmers to take advantage of differences in pollution-control costs among 
37. The EPA has been investigating opportunities to use economic incentives to
solve water quality problems. See, e.g. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF
WATER AND OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING AND EVALUATION, BENEFITS AND FEASIBILITY OF
EFFLUENT TRADING BETWEEN POINT SOURCES: AN ANALYSIS IN SUPPORT OF CLEAN WATER ACT
REAUTHORIZATION (1992); APOGEE RESEARCH, INC., INCENTIVE ANALYSIS FOR WA 
REAUTHORIZATION: POINT SOURCE/NONPOINT SOURCE TRADING FOR NUTRIENT DISCHARGE 
REDUCTIONS (1991); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, DECREASING THE DISCHARGE OF
BIOACCUMULATIVE TOXIC WATER POLLUTANTS: A POLICY  ANALYSIS (1992). 
38. There is an extensive body of literature on incentive-based mechanisms and
their role in pollution control. For general discussions, see, R.N. Stavins & B.W. 
Whitehead, Dealing with Pollution: Market-Based Incentives for Environmental Protection, 34 
ENVIRONMENT 7 (1992); CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, USING INCENTIVES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: AN OVERVIEW (1989) SEN. TIMOTHY E. WIRTH & SEN. JOHN HEINZ, 
PROJECT 88—ROUND II: INCENTIVES FOR ACTION: DESIGNING MARKET-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL 
STRATEGIES (1988); R.W. Hahn, Economic Prescripts for Environmental Problems: How the Patient 
Followed the Doctor’s Orders, 3 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 95 (1989). 
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different farming operations. As a result, the ultimate distribution of pollution-
control activities within the industry as a whole is more cost-effective, because 
those who can least expensively reduce pollution assume more of the 
abatement responsibility, and those with higher costs assume less. 
The burden on regulators to determine the available pollution-control 
technologies and associated costs also can be minimized under incentive-based 
programs. While some information is required to design the proper incentives, 
once the program is in place, the choice of control strategies rests with the 
farmers. Regulators are left with the more appropriate task of monitoring and 
enforcing compliance with the pollution limits. 
At least two additional factors make incentive programs attractive. First, 
they encourage innovation by providing direct financial rewards for creating 
better and cheaper pollution control methods. Second, because incentive 
programs are based on decentralized decision-making, they can conform to the 
characteristics of the farm industry and preserve the flexibility desired by 
farmers for responding to changes in economic, environmental, and 
technological conditions. Therefore, incentive-based approaches also increase 
the likelihood of compliance on the part of the regulated community. 
While there is a substantial body of literature on incentive-based 
programs, including tradable discharge permits,39 opportunities for employing 
incentives have only just begun to be tapped. A prominent example is the Clean 
Air Act Amendments of 1990, which established an emissions trading program 
for stationary air pollution sources and encouraged states to adopt flexible, 
incentive-based options in other areas.40 
39. See T.H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN REFORMING POLLUTION POLICY 
(1985); R.W. Hahn & R.G. Noll, Designing a Market for Tradable Emissions Permits, in REFORM OF
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (W. Maget ed., 1982) (hereinafter “HAHN & NOLL, MARKET DESIGN”); 
R.W. Hahn & R.G. Noll, Environmental Markets in the Year 2000, JOURNAL OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY, 
June 22, 1990, at 112 (1990) (hereinafter “HAHN & NOLL, YEAR 2000”); B. YANDLE, PERMIT FOR
TRADING FOR AGRICULTURAL NONPOINT-SOURCE POLLUTION CONTROL: BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR
WATER QUALITY IMPROVEMENT (1992); Bartfeld, supra note 16. 
40. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. (1990) See U.S. 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, TECHNICAL GUIDANCE MANUAL FOR PERFORMING WASTELOAD 
ALLOCATION, ch. 1, Stream Design Flow for Steady-State Modeling (1986); J. Goffman, Testimony on Title IV of 
the Clean Air Act Before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works Subcommittee 
on Clean Air and Nuclear Regulation (Oct. 21, 1993). Other trading programs in the area of air quality 
include the EPA’s Emissions Trading Program for criteria air pollutants; EPA’s trading program for 
leaded gasoline; the South Coast Air Quality Management District’s RECLAIM program; and the 
Montreal Protocol for Chlorofluorocarbons. See Hahn, supra note 38; HAHN & NOLL, YEAR 2000, supra 
note 39; J.P. DWYER, CALIFORNIA’S TRADABLE EMISSIONS POLICY AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE CONTROL OF
GREENHOUSE GASES: A CASE STUDY (1991);  Lily Whiteman, Trades to Remember: The Lead Phasedown, U.S. 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY JOURNAL (1992); U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1992a; 
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In the area of water quality, incentive-based programs have primarily 
relied on water pricing strategies, the reduction of water subsides, and the 
creation of water markets in several western states.41 In addition, pollution 
trading programs between regulated point sources and nonpoint sources that 
are subject to BMPs have been initiated at Dillon Reservoir, Cherry Creek 
Reservoir, Fox River Wisconsin, and the Tar-Pamlico River Basin.42 The potential 
for relying solely on economic incentives (in lieu of BMPs) to control agricultural 
pollution has received little attention, however.43 
D. Economic Incentives in the Grasslands
The Grasslands problem is well-suited to the use of economic incentives, 
because incentives offer a means for addressing economic difference among farmers 
and for providing flexibility for farm-level decision-making to an industry that is 
traditionally independent-minded and diverse. Among incentive systems, a system 
of tradable discharge permits is particularly attractive because 
• The nature of the pollution problem require a pollution cap or ceiling; 
• The characteristics of the regulated community are conducive to a
flexible system of cost-share; and
• Monitoring and enforcement of discharges are possible.
The principal obstacles to using tradable permits (or any other economic incentives) 
to regulate agricultural pollution seems to be based on the following assumptions: 
• Farmers cannot be made individually accountable for pollution
control because individual farms and drains are too numerous;
• Agricultural pollution cannot be controlled or monitored, which
precluded the use of trades or fees;
• Incentives provide less environmental protection that BMPs;
• Trading of toxic substances in river basis will cause pollutants to
become concentrated in one location;
SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, REGIONAL CLEAN AIR INCENTIVES MARKET (RECLAIM): 
SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS (1992). 
41. See, e.g., Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, 43 U.S.C. §§ 390aa—zz-1; CVPIA §
3404 (limitation on contracting and contract reform) & § 3405 (water transfers, 
improved water management, and conservation). 
42. See APOGEE RESEARCH, INC., NUTRIENT TRADING IN THE DILLON RESERVOIR (1991)
(hereinafter “APOGEE: DILLON”); APOGEE RESEARCH, INC., NUTRIENT TRADING IN THE TAR-
PAMLICO RIVER BASE (1991) (hereinafter “APOGEE: TAR-PAMLICO”); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 
OFFICE, supra note 37; Bartfeld, supra note 16. 
43. The use of incentive-based approaches for controlling agricultural nonpoint
source pollution has been addressed in: M.L. Taylor et al., Farm-Level Response to 
Agricultural Effluent Control Strategies: The Case of the Willamette Valley, 17 JOURNAL OF
AGRICULTURAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS 1 (1992); YANDLE, supra note 39. 
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• Tradable permits will not be cost-effective when the marginal costs of
pollution control do not differ dramatically among regulated sources; and 
• The calculation of a pollution cap (a prerequisite for a trading program) is
excessively complicated for rivers with highly variable flows. 
Many of these assumptions do not pertain to the Grasslands Region. 
Moreover, several of these beliefs must be addressed if any agricultural 
nonpoint source program is to be successful. A demonstration of how tradable 
discharge permits (and other economic incentives) can be used to address 
agricultural pollution problems in the grasslands may provide a model for 
analyzing the usefulness of these tools in other regions where agricultural or 
other nonpoint source pollution problems persist. 
III. ESTABLISHING POLLUTION REDUCTION GOALS
The first step in designing a water pollution control program is to identify 
specific environmental objectives and the reductions in pollution loads 
necessary to meet them. After these reductions are defined, the optimum 
program for achieving them can be determined. 
Establishment of pollution reduction goals generally involves three tasks: 
• Defining "safe" levels of pollution in the water body;
• Calculating the amounts o pollutants the region can discharge
without exceeding these "safe" levels; and
• Allocating the allowable pollution loads (or load reductions
necessary to achieve them) among the region's responsible parties.
A. Defining "Safe" Levels of Pollution
Agricultural drainage in the Grasslands region threatens the local 
wetlands, the San Joaquin River, and the river's tributaries. Current drainage 
discharge practices have concentrated this threat on the river itself, however, 
and on two upstream tributaries—Salt Slough and Mud Slough. These 
tributaries flow through and provide water supplies (when uncontaminated) for 
state, federal, and private wildlife refuges. As a result, the primary pollution 
control efforts in the region are focused on these water bodies. 
The California State Water Resources Control Board (hereinafter 
"SWRCB"), the Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board (hereinafter 
"RWQCB"), and the EPA have adopted numeric water quality standards that 
define "safe" concentration of major agricultural pollutants in the river and the 
two tributaries.44 Of these pollutants the RWQCB has identified selenium—the 
44. See 57 Fed. Reg. 60848 (Dec. 22, 1992); STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, ORDER 
91-12: WATER QUALITY CONTROL PLAN FOR INLAND SURFACE WATERS OF CALIFORNIA (1991) (hereinafter 
“INLAND SURFACE WATERS PLAN”). See also STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, RESOLUTION 90-28: 
APPROVAL OF CENTRAL VALLEY REGIONAL WATER QUALITY CONTROL BOARD, WATER QUALITY CONTROL PLAN 
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trace element responsible for the bird deformities which plagued Kesterson 
Reservoir—as the primary pollutant of concern. The RWQCB reached this 
conclusion because of the severe adverse affects of selenium on fish and wildlife 
and because the reductions in subsurface farm drainage necessary to meet the 
selenium standard also will reduce the loads of other high-priority pollutants. 
Currently applicable selenium standards are shown on Table 1.  Concentrations 
of selenium often exceed applicable selenium standards in the San Joaquin 
River. In some tributaries—particularly Salt and Mud Sloughs—the standards 
are consistently exceeded during the pre-irrigation and irrigation seasons 
(Figure 2). Subsurface drainage discharges from irrigated agriculture in the 
Grasslands region account for over 80 percent of the selenium load in the San 
Joaquin River and sloughs.45 
The water quality monitoring and compliance point chosen by the 
RWQCB to represent San Joaquin River quality downstream of the agricultural 
drainage discharges is Crows Landing (Figure 3). The Crows Landing station is 
located 22 miles downstream from the area where drainage actually is 
discharged to the river, and is below the San Joaquin's confluence with the 
(1989) (1990) (hereinafter “RESOLUTION 90-28”) (stating boron and molybdenum objectives, as well 
as selenium, “maximum” objectives for the San Joaquin River (mouth of the Merced River to 
Vernalis)). The EPA is currently developing a selenium water quality criterion for wildlife, which 
may become limiting in the future. 
45. C.R. Kratzer et al., Achieving Selenium and Boron Objectives in the San Joaquin River
through Drainage Reduction, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND PAN-AMERICAN REGIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON IRRIGATION AND DRAINAGE 319 (1989). 
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Merced River, a source of substantial dilution flows. The specific agricultural 
discharge points are approximately 20 to 30 miles away from the river and reach 
the river via Mud Slough and Salt Slough. Because of this configuration, Crow's 
Landing readings underestimate the pollution levels farther upstream.  Since 
the selenium concentration standard applies to the entire length of the San 
Joaquin River and its tributaries, even if the standard at Crows Landing is met, 
water quality in upstream reaches may still exceed the standard. 
Accordingly, this study assess the pollution load limits necessary to 
achieve the established selenium standard: 5 micrograms per liter (µg/l) as a 
four-day average concentration, not to be exceeded more than once every three 
years in the San Joaquin River, measured at Crows Landing.46  Because drainage 
discharges convey significant loads of other high-priority pollutants (e.g., boron 
and salt), efforts to reduce selenium loading from this region also will help to 
achieve compliance with standards for these pollutants. The pollution loading 
requirements calculated in this study do not reflect the additional decreases 
that may be required to comply with antidegradation requirements.47 
B. Translating "Safe" Levels into Allowable Pollution Loads
The standard method for determining allowable pollution loads for water 
bodies that do not meet water quality standards is dictate by the CWA, which 
requires that water quality standards (expressed as the acceptable 
concentration of pollutants in a water body) be translated into "Total Maximum 
Daily Loads" (hereinafter "TMDLs").48 The TMDL first establishes the allowable 
pollution load from all the pollution sources in the region, based on the 
capacity of the "receiving water"—in this case the San Joaquin  
46. The regional load allocation derived in this study is based on a direct
conversion of a water concentration standard.  In the future, load allowances (or mass 
emissions limits) may be derived independent of water concentration standards, based 
on the capacity of an ecosystem to safely absorb pollutants as measured in sediments 
or plant and animal tissues. If so, the methods for deriving the TMDL will be different, 
but the implementation issues will be much the same as discussed here. 
47. Federal antidegradation policy (see 40 CFR 131.012 (1994)) was reinforced by
section 303(d) of the 1987 Clean Water Act Amendments. California has adopted 
similar requirements. 
48. Clean Water Act § 303(d). The CWA uses a two-pronged approach to
improving water quality: It requires technology-based pollution controls for specified 
types of industries or other “point sources,” and it requires additional pollution control 
efforts in cases where, even after technologies are installed, water quality standards 
still will be violated. The TMDL calculation determines which sources will be the focus 
of these additional efforts. 
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River—to dilute the pollution to a safe concentration. The TMDL procedure the 
allocates the total load among all of the relevant point sources, nonpoint 
source, background loads, and a margin of safety (Figure 4). This allocation 
allows each category of discharger to be held accountable for its 
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 own contribution to excess pollution loads. California has identified the San 
Joaquin River as a quality-impaired water body for which a TMDL calculation is 
required.49 
49. The 1991 Water Quality Assessment prepared by the RWQCB catalogs the
quality of water bodies pursuant to section 304(l) of the CWA.  Water bodies listed 
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The first step in the Grasslands TMDL—which defines the pollution load 
that can be discharged into the river without violating the 5 µg/l water quality 
objective for selenium—is determined by the dilution capacity of the river, 
which in turn is a function of the flow regime in the river. In other words, the 
concentration-based standard is converted to allowable load (measured in 
pounds) according to the standard formula: 
under this section, including a 130-mile stretch of the San Joaquin River, are those 
affected by both point and nonpoint pollution source and which are not expected to 
meet water quality standards even with effective point source controls. CENTRAL VALLEY 
REGIONAL WATER QUALITY CONTROL BOARD, WATER QUALITY ASSESSMENT (1991). 
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Dilution Capacity (or TMDL) = Water Quality Standard x River Flow 
Prediction of the flow regime is difficult for western rivers, such as the San 
Joaquin, because flows may vary by orders of magnitude across seasons and 
years. Also, flow data often are limited or are not representative of current 
conditions. To address this problem, a simple method was developed to 
account for the varying river flows that are typical in developed river basins in 
the irrigated West. This generic method was then used to derive a TMDL for 
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selenium for the middle reach of the San Joaquin River.50 This screening-level 
TMDL51 was developed in conjunction with the RWQCB.52 
The next step of the TMDL procedure allocates the allowable regional 
pollution load among responsible parties according to the standard formula: 
TMDL = wasteload allocation + load allocation + margin of safety53 
The resulting monthly load allocations for the agricultural community in 
the Grasslands region as a whole area shown in Tables 2a-c, column 12.54 
Corresponding final daily load allocations are shown in column 13. 
C. Allocating Allowable Loads Among Responsible Parties
To be effective, a pollution control program must assign responsibility for 
pollution load reductions to the appropriate parties. In the case of the 
50. TERRY F. YOUNG & CHELSEA H. CONGDON, PLOWING NEW GROUND (1994). 
51. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF WATER REGULATIONS AND
STANDARDS, GUIDANCE FOR WATER QUALITY-BASED DECISIONS: THE TMDL PROCESS (1991) The EPA 
generally accepts a phased approach to TMDLs involving nonpoint sources and/or where there is 
considerable uncertainty about the characteristic of the pollutant (e.g., its persistence, pathways, 
interaction with other pollutants). A screening-level TMDL is the first step of a phased TMDL. A 
phased approach also included a monitoring program and predetermined schedule for 
reassessing the TMDL and allocation. This option allows a state to implement water quality-
based control measures where beneficial uses are known to be impaired but the resource is not 
being regulated for lack of adequate data. 
52. See Karkoski et al., Development of a selenium TMDL for the San Joaquin River, in
MANAGEMENT OF IRRIGATION AND DRAINAGE SYSTEMS (1993). Substantial assistance was also 
provided by EPA Region IX and EPA Headquarters. See YOUNG & CONGDON, supra note 50, 
at Appendix B (detailing the calculations). 
53. The wasteload allocation is the portion of the TMDL attributable to point sources,
and the load allocation is the portion of the TMDL attributable to nonpoint source and natural 
background sources. The margin of safety is provided to account for uncertainties in the data of 
analysis. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY. OFFICE OF WATER, TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT 
FOR WATER QUALITY-BASED TOXICS CONTROL (1991) (hereinafter “TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT”). In the 
case of the San Joaquin River, there are no contributions from point sources, so the wasteload 
allocation is zero. The load allocation is comprised of background loads (from the main stem of 
the San Joaquin river, the Merced River, and addenda selenium loads from the managed 
wetlands in the region) and drainage discharges from agricultural operations in the Grasslands 
region. The margin of safety was allotted ten percent of the total load, which is considered 
minimal given the uncertainty in the input data and the bioaccumulative and other exposure 
characteristics of selenium. 
54. The load was not subdivided among irrigation districts or farmers at this
stage. Options for district and farmer allocations are discussed in the next section. 
240 
 West  Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008 
Grasslands region and other regions of irrigated agriculture, opportunities for 
pollution reduction stem from irrigation improvements at the farm level and, to 
a more limited extent, from the operational changes at the water district level.55 
Therefore, an effective program to reduce agricultural drainage must establish 
accountability and incentives for pollution control at the farm level, by 
allocating the regional pollution load (defined by the TMDL) among 
contributing farmers.56 This farm-level allocation may either be calculated 
directly from the regional pollution load, or be calculated in a two-step process 
which first allocates the regional pollution load among districts and then 
allocates the district load among farmers. The choice between a one-step and a 
two-step process depends upon the type of pollution control program desired. 
For example, the allocation of the allowable pollution load among water 
districts provides the basis for regulatory programs that hold districts accountable for 
pollution control. District allocations could define effluent limits for a traditional 
discharge permit program at the district level—an option that currently exists for 
regulating agricultural dischargers under California law.57 Alternatively, with a system 
of tradable discharge permits, the initial district allocations would provide the basis for 
subsequent market-based adjustments among districts. Similarly, district-level 
effluent fees would be based on district pollution targets. 
Farm-level allocations provide the targets for farm-level accountably and 
incentives. The method for determining farm-level allocations may be the same 
for the entire region or may vary from district to district. Farm-level targets could 
serve as the basis for prescribing BMPs or for assigning effluent fees or tiered 
water prices to farmers within the region or within individual districts. 
The precision with which the allocations must be determined, as well as 
the implications of different allocation options for "fairness" or equity among 
the regulated parties, will vary under the different regulatory approaches. 
Estimates of both the district- and farm-level allocations thus help to inform 
decisions about the most appropriate regulatory program for a given area. 
Similarly, preliminary estimates of both district and farm-level allocations 
provide an important basis for pollution control planning and investments by 
the regulated community 
1. District-Level Allocation
Two of the most commonly used methods for allocation pollution 
reductions are: (1) to require each source to make equal progress towards 
55. In this respect, agricultural drainage problems differ from many other types
of wastewater problems, such as municipal wastewater discharges, which are more 
amenable to a single, regional treatment facility. 
56. This allocation step is often included as part of the standard TMDL calculation. It is 
presented as a separate procedure here to emphasize the variety of options available. 
57. See discussion infra Part V.
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reducing pollution through equal increments of removal; and (2) to require each 
source to achieve a fixed level of pollution control per unit of production 
through equal final pollutant concentrations, regardless of the necessary level of 
pollutant-removal efficiency.58 When applied to pollution load allocations 
among the Grasslands districts, these approaches would result respectively in: 
(1) allocations that are proportional to historical drainage outputs, expressed as
either drainage volume or selenium load; and (2) allocations that are
proportional to irrigated acreage, drained acreage, or selenium-contaminated
acreage within the district.59
In the Grasslands region, the historical record of district-level drainage 
discharges (Table 3) is adequate to support a legitimate estimate of district 
allocations using most of these methods. Estimates of the district allocations 
that would result from using historical drainage outputs, irrigated acreage, and 
drained acreage, as well as one weighted combination of these three factors are 
shown in Tables 4 through 7.60 
Besides the choice of allocation method, district allocations will depend 
on the number of districts or other entities included in the overall distribution. 
While it is generally assumed that the number of water districts that discharge 
to the San Joaquin River will not increase in the future, the allocation can be 
calculated to include other potential discharging entities.61 
Accordingly, two alternate calculations of district load allocation have 
been made for each of the scenarios described in Tables 4 through 7. These two 
calculations appear in the tables as Alternative A, which assumes that only 
known and monitored discharging entities are included in the distribution, and 
58. TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 53.
59. Initial allocations may also be determined by auction.
60. The purpose of this section is explore various allocation methods rather
than choose a particular method and assign effluent limits. With this in mind, several 
simplifying assumptions were made. For example, EPA-recommended methods for 
translating a wasteload allocation (or load allocation) into maximum daily or average 
monthly permit limits were not used. Effluent variability also was not taken into 
account. In general, such calculations would tend to reduce district load allocations 
relative to the allocations present in this section. Similarly, it is assumed that all of the 
selenium load discharged by each district actually reaches the river without being used 
by farmers downstream, or taken up by biota en route. 
61. For example, including additional entities might be warranted to address
drainage load contributions from unincorporated agricultural lands (e.g., lands outside 
existing water and drainage district boundaries) within the Grasslands region. Portions 
of the Westlands Water District also lie within the hydrologic boundaries of the 
Grasslands region. District allocations could include these lands if the current 
prohibition against Westlands’ disposal of subsurface drainage into the river were to be 
lifted in the future. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, MID-PACIFIC REGION, DRAFT 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATE: SAN LUIS UNIT DRAINAGE PROGRAM (1991). 
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Alternative B, which assumes that a fraction of the allowable pollution load is 
reserved for additional dischargers. 
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a. Scenario 1: Allocation Based on Historical
Discharge Levels
Under this method, each district is required to reduce selenium 
discharges by the same percentage relative to its historical discharges. In other 
words, if the regional agricultural load must be reduced to eleven percent of the 
historical regional load, then each individual district must reduce its discharges 
to eleven percent of its historical discharges. 
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The years 1986-89 represent the pollution loading baseline.62 According to 
his baseline (expressed in the average annual number of pounds of selenium 
discharged), the district-level drainage reductions necessary to meet the 
selenium concentration standard during critical, dry/below normal and above 
normal/wet water years are shown in Table 4. This table also shows the drainage 
reductions required to meet a possible interim goal in each year type. 
An allocation based on historical selenium loads implicitly addresses inequities 
among districts due to physical factors beyond the farmer's control. Specifically, by 
relying on historic discharge levels, the varying degrees of soil contamination within the 
districts are accounted for along with the quantities of drainage produced. Without 
detailed maps of shallow groundwater quality or selenium contamination of soils, this 
allocation method is the best available approach for taking soil quality into account 
when assigning pollution control responsibility. 
The historical discharge allocation method takes into account physical limitations 
on irrigation efficiency, because quantity of drainage is a function of both controllable 
factors such as irrigation technologies and practices and uncontrollable factor such as 
soil uniformity.63 Finally, the historically based allocations avoid penalizing those districts 
and landowners who have significantly reduced pollution since 1988. 
b. Scenario 2: Allocation Based on Drained Acreage
This method reflects a policy assumption that only the acreage underlain with 
subsurface drains should be included in the load distribution. Selenium load 
allocations would be apportioned without respect to the degree of soil selenium 
contamination.64 Using this method, the district-level allocations shown in Table 5 
differ significantly from those derived from the historical baseline. 
c. Scenario 3: Allocation Based on Irrigated Acreage
A different policy assumption underlies this approach—the notion that all 
irrigated land within the Grasslands region contributes to the regional selenium 
loading problem, since all irrigated land contributes to the elevation of the 
region's shallow groundwater table. As shown in Table 6, however, an allocation 
62. Despite the seven-year drought in California, districts continued to receive normal water 
supplies until 1990. Farmers generally did not being to change irrigation practices in response to the 
drought until after 1990. Using a more recent baseline would penalize those farmers and districts 
that responded most aggressively to the existing voluntary drainage reduction program. 
63. Non-uniform soils can prevent farmers from achieving high water use
efficiency, especially where furrow technologies are employed, because water cannot 
be distributed evenly along the row and a highly efficient application of water could 
result in under irrigation of the distant portions of the field. 
64. This allocation would account for land quality only to the extent that
contamination problems are in fact associated with the drained acreage within the district. 
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based on total irrigated acreage has the effect of granting districts with larger 
land areas greater shares of the river's dilution capacity, regardless of the 
distribution of subsurface drains and soil selenium contamination. 
d. Scenario 4: Allocation Based on a Weighted
Combination of Factors
Each of the first three scenarios has certain advantages and disadvantages from 
a regulatory perspective, and different distributional (i.e. equity) implications for 
individual districts. The advantages of the various options can be captured, and the 
disadvantages partly ameliorated, but the allocating pollution loads according to a 
weighted combination of factors. Table 7 shows the allocation that results from 
assigning a 50 percent weight of historical selenium discharges and a 25 percent 
weight each to the amount of irrigated and drained acreage. 
Each of the four district allocation scenarios presented here would satisfy the 
primary regulatory goal of defining district-level pollution reduction requirements 
sufficient to meet selenium water quality standards in the San Joaquin River. Each 
scenario also offers the additional benefits of reducing the loads of other pollutants 
of concern and increasing water conservation. Moreover, none of the allocation 
options poses a significant administrative burden on local agency officials, because 
each can be calculated using existing data and district-level allocations (unlike farm-
level allocations) can be readily monitors and enforced under existing conditions. 
Each of the district-level allocation methods therefore would be acceptable from the 
perspective of the regulator. 
The critical issue in selecting among the allocation methods is the 
fairness of the distribution of pollution control responsibility as perceived by 
the water districts and their farmers. Scenarios 1, 2, and 3 reflect different policy 
choices, result in substantially different allocations among districts, and 
therefore would result in differences in the distribution of compliance costs. 
Such equity concerns could be addressed by allowing the agricultural 
community (represented by the districts or regional entity) to identify a 
preferred allocation method. If no consensus can be reached, the local regulator 
agency could adopt a weighted formula similar to that presented as Scenario 4.65 
65. The district allocation options presented in Tables 4 through 7 show annual
load allocations for the sake of simplicity. The San Joaquin River TMDL defines 
allowable loads which differ, however, for different months. See Tables 2a-c. Similarly, 
final district level pollution load allocations must specify allowable loads each month 
of each year type. These would be calculated by applying the same formulas used to 
create the annual load allocations in Tables 4 through 7. 
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2. Allocation Among Farmers
Any regulatory program designed to reduce drainage discharges from 
irrigated agriculture ultimately must address farm-level irrigation and water 
management practices. This is true regardless of whether the regulatory agency 
chooses to deal with individual farms directly or with larger entities such as 
water or drainage districts (which, in turn, would deal with the individual farms). 
In either case, conversion of the regional pollution load (or the district load 
allocation) into a farm-level goal or allocation allows farmers and regulators to 
assess the magnitude and affordability of pollution control requirements. The 
process of calculation farm-level pollution goals (i.e., the ease or difficulty of the 
calculation due to data constraints) also affects the choice of pollution control 
program, because different programs may require different levels of accuracy 
about discharges at the farm and district levels. 
The most direct method for establishing a farm-level goal is to divide the 
allowable regional selenium load among the subsurface drainage sumps, 
weighted by acreage.66 This allocation can be problematic, however, because of 
the difficulty in establishing farm-specific contributions to each sump. In 
recognition of this problem, previous drainage management plans have 
recommended that drainage reduction targets be applied to all irrigated lands 
rather than focusing solely on the drained acreage.67 
Under this allocation method, an average selenium or drainage allowance 
per acre is determined, regardless of existing drain systems. The results of this 
calculation appear in Table 8.68 As shown in Table 8, compliance with existing 
water quality standards and the corresponding regional load allocations would 
require farmers to reduce drainage to little more than the amount of excess 
irrigation water necessary to maintain the salt balance in the soil. This is 
particularly true for critically dry years.  
66. See YOUNG & CONGDON, supra note 50.
67. CENTRAL VALLEY REGIONAL WATER QUALITY CONTROL BOARD, WATER QUALITY 
CONTROL PLAN (1989); SWRCB REPORT, supra note 31; DRAINAGE PROGRAM FINAL REPORT, 
supra note 32. 
68. See YOUNG & CONGDON, supra note 50.
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Farm-level drainage generation would be limited to approximately 0.1 to 
0.2 acre-feet of "adjusted deep percolation"69 (hereinafter "ADP") per irrigated 
acre per year (af/ac/yr). The interim goal would allow about 0.2 to 0.4 af/ac/yr of 
ADP. In practice, these farm-level goals may be adjusted upward if district 
recycling of drainage water increases.70 
69. For purposes of this Article, “adjusted deep percolation” is equal to the amount of water 
that moves downward past the root zone (deep percolation) minus 0.3 af/ac/yr (which is assumed 
necessary to maintain a salt balance in the soil). Coincidentally, the amount of water moving 
downward out of the semiconfined aquifer (where farm drains are located) and through the 
Corcoran clay layer is about 0.3 af/ac/yr on average. DRAINAGE PROGRAM FINAL REPORT, supra note 32. 
70. Most, if not all, districts are able to recirculate drainage water, mixing it with
incoming water deliveries or groundwater for reuse within the district (or transfer to 
other districts). Therefore, the average efficiency of water use in the region is higher 
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The level of irrigation efficiency implied by the calculations in Table 9 would 
require a high rate of uniformity of water application. This, in turn, would require farms 
to install more efficient irrigation equipment or use current equipment more 
efficiently. For example, cotton farmers would have to practice very effective 
management of quarter-mile furrow systems with tailwater return or install more 
advanced technologies such as surge systems and linear-move sprinklers. 
3. Implications for Program Design
The San Joaquin River TMDL has several implications for the choice of a 
regulatory program for the Grasslands. First, the TMDL indicates that selenium 
loads must be significantly decreased in order to meet water quality standards. 
For example, compliance with the existing 5 µg/l standard for selenium in 
critical water years requires selenium load reductions of more than 80 percent 
from 1991 levels (a critical year with curtailed water delivers), and reductions of 
89 percent from 1986-1988 levels.71 Since the required load reductions are 
substantial, and because selenium is both toxic and bioaccumulative, the 
pollution control program should be designed to comply with the regional load 
allocation or polluting "cap" as closely as possible. Excess discharges of 
selenium will have unacceptable environmental impacts, but overly stringent 
load restrictions could cause farmers to incur significant and unnecessary costs. 
The pollution load calculations for the San Joaquin River also 
demonstrate that the perceived difficulty of deriving a pollution cap can be 
overcome. The required load reductions both for the Grasslands region as a 
whole and for individual districts can be estimated using the minimal resources. 
Yet, the estimates would be sufficiently reliable to initiate effective water quality 
regulation and to generate substantial environmental benefits. 
In contrast, the task of allocating the regional load among individual 
farmers is technically complex. Although the regional average farm-level goals 
presented here are accurate enough to design a pollution abatement program, 
more precise farm-level goals could be calculated within individual districts. The 
relative difficulty of calculating farm-level allocations within districts—
than the efficiency of the average farm, and less drainage is discharged into the river 
than is actually produced at the farm level. 
71. Even assuming a more lenient excursion rate as an interim goal (i.e., once in five
months rather than once in three years), the actual 1991 discharge levels would exceed allowable 
loads in all year types. Moreover, these annual load reduction figures do not reflect the monthly 
variations in load limitations. Greater drainage reductions would be required during the months 
of the pre-irrigation and irrigation seasons than during other times of the year. Figure 2. Finally, 
the calculated drainage load allocation is derived for the Crows Landing compliance point where 
readings, as explained earlier, underestimate pollution farther upstream. Stricter limits on 
drainage discharges would be necessary to meet existing water quality standards in the 
tributaries and in the river upstream from its confluence with the Merced River. 
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combined with the fact that district allocations are easier to calculate than farm-
level allocations—suggest that it may be appropriate for a regional pollution 
abatement program to combine specific limits at the district level with more 
flexible programs at the farm level. 
IV. REGULATORY OPTIONS FOR ACHIEVING POLLUTION CONTROL
OBJECTIVES
To meet the pollution-control objective for the Grasslands region, 
substantial decreases in agricultural drainage is required. The key to 
accomplishment of these reductions is improved irrigation management at each 
individual farm.72 Thus, achievement of the regional load limits ultimately 
depends on the creation of a program that holds individual farmers responsible 
for pollution control. 
A. Regulatory Options for the Grasslands
As discussed above, states that have attempted to control agricultural 
pollution problems generally used programs based on the voluntary adoption of 
BMPs. Continuing water quality problems associated with agricultural pollution 
indicate that these voluntary programs must be improved ore replaced with 
formal regulatory programs. 
In theory, programs for regulating agricultural drainage can be divided 
into two categories—tradition "command-and-control" programs73 and 
incentive-based programs. In practice, the distinctions between the two 
categories often becomes blurred. For example, an incentive based tradable 
permit program may be premised on discharge permits (for point sources) and 
BMPs (for nonpoint sources). By the same token, a traditional BMP program 
may stipulate the use of an incentive program such as a tiered input pricing. 
A pollution control program for the Grasslands region could combine 
components of two or more of the regulatory options described below. And, 
these programs could be applied at either the district or the farm level. Indeed, 
because of the significant role of local districts in irrigation and drainage 
72. The focus on farm-level reductions has been recommended by several
agencies, because the methods are well understood and available and do not require 
substantial financial commitments by the government. Where on-farm source 
reduction is not sufficient to attain environmental objects, drainage recycling and/or 
selective land retirement at the district level also may be undertaken. See, e.g., DRAINAGE 
PROGRAM FINAL REPORT, supra note 32; SWRCB REPORT, supra note 31. 
73. The term “command-and-control” generally refers to regulatory programs that rely on 
technology-based effluent limits which are enforced through site-specific permits. The term also 
is used more broadly to refer to any program where specific effluent limits or pollution-control 
technologies are prescribed. This more general meaning is adopted here. 
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management,74 the optimal regulatory system may well be two-tiered, using one 
type of program at the district level and a different type of program within each 
district to reach the farm level.75 
1. Best Management Practices
Under existing nonpoint source policy, states are expected to develop 
comprehensive programs that identify technology based BMPs for a wide range 
of land uses, including irrigated agriculture generally prescribe the use of 
irrigation scheduling, water metering, efficient water application systems, land 
contouring, tailwater (surface runoff) recovery, and drainage control.76 These 
BMPs are, of necessity, less specific than technology-based requirements for 
point sources and are intended to allow for site-specific adaptation. As the basis 
for a regulatory program in the Grasslands, BMPs probably would take the form 
of mandatory, uniform, technology-based requirements for all farmers.77 
Under a mandatory BMP program, the responsible regulatory agency 
translates the regional pollution goal into a technology requirement for all of the 
farmers within the region.78 Farmers are responsible only for using the prescribed 
technology, although the use of more efficient technologies is allowed. 
To select a BMP, the regulator must take into account two critical factors: 
the ability of the BMP to achieve farm-level pollution load objectives and the 
accuracy with which compliance can be verified. Knowledge of these factors in 
74. See discussion infra Part V.
75. A number of possible incentive-based options, including a performance bond, are not 
evaluated here. The Environmental Defense Fund proposed a performance bond for agricultural 
sources in the Grasslands region during negotiations (1990-1991) over the terms and conditions for 
the proposed reopening of the San Luis Drain to collect and convey drainage for disposal in the San 
Joaquin River. The RWQCB also proposed a performance bond to help meet waste discharge 
requirements for Pima Gro Systems in Fresno County. CENTRAL VALLEY REGIONAL WATER QUALITY 
CONTROL BOARD, NOTICE OF TENTATIVE WASTE DISCHARGE REQUIREMENTS FOR PIMA GRO SYSTEMS, INC. ET AL., 
SLUDGE APPLICATIONS TO LAND (1993) In the Grasslands case, the proposed performance bond shared 
essential characteristics with effluent fees. For this reason, performance bonds are not evaluated 
separately here. 
76. The EPA’s Guidance for Implementation of the Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments of 1990 
provides the most recent and comprehensive example of how national policy for nonpoint source 
pollution control is evolving. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDANCE SPECIFYING 
MANAGEMENT MEASURES FOR SOURCES OF NONPOINT POLLUTION IN COASTAL WATERS (1993). 
77. Alternatively, BMP programs can be performance-based. For example, a BMP program 
could be adopted requiring no more that 0.2 af/ac/yr of drainage (ADP) output. Because the 
characteristics of a performance-based BMP program are substantially the same as a permit 
program which assigns effluent limits, the performance-based BMP is not discussed separately here. 
78. Theoretically, the mandated BMP might be different for different crops, since
the performance of each technology/management regime varies with different crops. 
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turn requires a considerable amount of information about farm-level conditions 
and day-to-day management of irrigation technologies. Moreover, the 
implementation of a BMP often is difficult to verify. For example, the manner in 
which an irrigation system is operated cannot practically be monitor or verified. 
How often and how well a farmer performs maintenance on equipment also is 
difficult to assess. Consequently, a BMP usually specifies only physical 
components. To estimate the actual resulting pollution output, the regulator 
must make some assumption about the level of management. 
Once a BMP is chosen, its verifiable components can be monitors at the 
farm level by the regulatory entity or the water district. Fees or penalties are 
used to enforce compliance. At the district level, BMPs may stipulate certain 
practices including installation of irrigation water recycling systems, adopting of 
tiered water pricing, and development of a land retirement program for farmers 
within the district. Such programmatic requirements generally do not specify 
performance, however, and therefore do not sure that the desired level of water 
conservation or participation will be achieved. 
2. Traditional Permits
Permits are familiar in the context of point source regulation. Effluent limitations 
set forth in Nation Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (hereinafter "NPDES") 
permits generally set forth the amount, the concentration, and the frequency of pollutant 
discharges allowed for individual sources.79 Under California Law, the SWRCB has 
authority to issue permits to various agricultural sources: farmers engaged in irrigated 
agriculture; existing water or drainage service districts; and regional entities that 
represent larger groups of service districts.80 
Ultimately, a permit-based system for drainage regulation depends on the 
ability of regulators to identify monitorable discharge points and to assign 
responsibility for discharges from those points to districts or individual farms. 
Today, discharges from districts in the Grasslands are monitored pursuant to 
requirements imposed by the RWQCB. Monitoring discharges from individual 
farms is both more expensive and more difficult.81 Irrigation water inputs can be 
79. These limitations are set forth in individual permits issued and administered
by state or federal agencies under the NPDES. Other types of permits include general 
permits (e.g. storm water permits) that do not specify effluent limits. 
80. See discussion infra Part V. In the early 1980’s, the State Water Resources
Control Board was preparing to issue such a permit for agricultural discharges at the 
terminus of the San Luis Drain. The process was cut short when the disaster at 
Kesterson occurred. See STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, INTERIM GUIDANCE ON
POSSIBLE WASTE DISCHARGE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPOSED SAN LUIS DRAIN (1981). 
81. Measuring the amount of drainage water that is collected by the subsurface farm drains 
is relatively straightforward technically and can be accomplished by using flow meters at sumps, 
electrical records of sump pump operation, flumes equipped with measurement gauges in gravity-
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used as a surrogate for drainage outputs at the farm level, however because 
irrigation water deliveries are easily monitored, and selenium loads in drainage 
water are a function of the amount of irrigation water inputs. Thus, if the 
relationship between water inputs and selenium outputs can be predicted, 
water inputs can be used as an alternate measure of pollution load.82 
Because selenium loads are the product of both the concentration of selenium 
in the drainage water and the quantity of drainage water produced, both parameters 
must be addressed in order to derive the surrogate measurement. The relationship 
between irrigation water inputs and the concentration of selenium in the drainage 
water has been determined with sufficient accuracy to derive an input surrogate.83 
Selenium concentrations in drainage water vary significantly in different areas, 
however. Much of this difference can be predicted from location (for example, land on 
an ephemeral fan or at the edge of an alluvial fan), depth of groundwater, and from 
selenium concentrations in shallow groundwater. Other variables that cause 
differences in selenium concentrations on different farms include the age of the 
drainage system, the length of time the land has been irrigated, and other factors.84 If 
field-to-field precision in selenium concentrations is necessary, the easiest method to 
establish the surrogate would be to survey the selenium concentrations in drainage 
from various fields. In some districts, these data are already available.85 
flow drains, and/or saddle meters on pipelines. Installation of these devices and periodic recording of 
these measurements would, however, be a new and perhaps significant expense. 
   To determine the selenium loads exiting the drains, the concentration of selenium (which varies 
by at least two orders of magnitude across the region) must also be measured. Although several 
factors influence the concentration of selenium in drain water from a particular field at a particular 
time, the average concentration of selenium in drain water from a single field or farm would not 
be expected to vary significantly over time and could be characterized by relatively few 
concentration measurements. 
82. See YOUNG AND CONGDON, supra note 50, at Appendix A (discussing the methodology for 
calculating an input surrogate for drainage outputs). 
83. See DRAINAGE PROGRAM FINAL REPORT, supra note 32; D. Wichelns & D. Nelson, An Empircal 
Model of the Relationship Between Irrigation and the Volume of Water Collected in Subsurface Drains, 16 AGRICULTURAL 
WATER MANAGEMENT 293 (1989);  R.J. Gilliom, Overview of Sources, Distribution, and Mobility of Selenium on the 
San Joaquin Valley, California, in THE ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT OF WATER AND DRAINAGE IN AGRICULTURE 
(A. Dinar et al. eds., 1991); S.J. Deverel & S.P. Millard, Distribution and Mobility of Selenium and Other Trace 
Elements in Shallow Groundwater of the Western San Joaquin Valley, California, 22 ENVTL. SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY 697 (1988); R. Fujii et al., Distribution of Selenium in Soils of Agricultural Fields, Western San Joaquin 
Valley, California, in SOIL SOCIETY OF AMERICA JOURNAL 1 (1998). 
84. See, e.g., Gilliom, supra note 82; S.J. Deverel et al., Selenium in Tile Drain Water, in
PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF SOURCES, DISTRIBUTION, AND MOBILITY OF SELENIUM IN THE SAN 
JOAQUIN VALLEY, CALIFORNIA (R.J. Gilliom et al. eds., 1989). 
85. BROADVIEW WATER DISTRICT, DRAINAGE OPERATION PLAN OF 1990 (1989); Personal
Communication with M. Hedrick, Water Master, Panoche Water and Drainage District (1992). 
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The predicted selenium concentration in drainage water is then used to 
calculate the amount of drainage water that can be produced and still comply 
with the allowable pollution load. To derive the input surrogate, the remaining 
step is to relate the amount of drainage produced to the amount of irrigation 
water used. This relationship is conceptually straightforward: using less 
irrigation water creates less drainage water. Quantitatively, an average 
relationship between the allowable quantity of drainage water and the 
corresponding amount of irrigation water that can be applied during the 
growing season can be derived for each crop. 
Once calculated, the input surrogate is relatively straightforward to use. 
Surface water deliveries to farmers are already metered (or soon will be) at the 
farm or field level. If groundwater prices become competitive with those for 
surface water, groundwater use also should be accounted for. Although few 
districts currently require formal reporting of groundwater use, recent changes 
in state groundwater policy86 allows districts to adopt groundwater management 
programs that may require such reporting. 
Although the input surrogate can be derived for each farm or field, using 
the surrogate at the district level in conjunction with traditional permits, 
effluent fees, or tradable discharge permits at the farm level generally would not 
require such precision. Rather, the average relationship within a district or the 
region could be used as a basis for farm-level limits. The use of a district-wide 
average considerably simplifies the calculation of the surrogate, because 
variations in drainage flows and selenium concentrations are attenuated when 
all of the individual sources are combined.87 
Finally, an "input surrogate" provides a mechanism for incorporating farms 
without drains into the regulator system. Accordingly, the RWQCB presently 
could issue a waste discharge requirement (hereinafter "WDR")88 to districts or 
individual farmers and establish an enforcement fine or penalty. 
3. Tradable Discharge Permits
Under a system of tradable discharge permits, the regulator agency 
establishes the total allowable pollution load, or "cap," and allocates this "cap" 
among districts or farmers in individual permits.89 For purposes of this study, the 
allocation is assumed to be assigned, or "grandfathered," to districts according 
to one of the allocation scenarios presented in Part III. Farm-level allocations 
86. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10750-10767 (West 1984).
87. Deverel et al., supra note 84.
88. WDRs are the state equivalent of NPDES permits under federal law pursuant
to which the federal EPA or state agencies assign pollution control responsibility to 
point sources. See discussion infra Part V. 
89. Alternatively, a regional entity such as a Regional Drainage District could
perform the allocations. See discussions infra Part V. 
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could be assigned regionwide according to a similar method or they could be 
assigned by the individual districts. 
After the initial allocation, districts and farmers may buy and sell allocations (or 
portions thereof). Water districts and farmers that face lower pollution control costs or 
that choose to control pollution beyond the level specified in the allocation may 
reduce their own pollution more than initially required and then sell excess 
allocations. Districts and framers with higher abatement costs have the option of 
buying allocations rather than investing in pollution control. The price and ultimate 
distribution of pollution permits (and therefore abatement responsibility) is 
determined through these market transactions. In essence, the market provides an 
opportunity for cost-sharing90 between districts (or between farmers) that face different 
marginal pollution control costs. Total permitted discharges may not exceed the 
pollution cap, however, and any expansion in irrigated acreage would be 
accommodated through purchases of existing allocations. 
To enable the trading system to function smoothly, limitations on trades and 
regulatory interference in trading transactions must be kept to a minimum.91 In the 
Grasslands region, the rules for trading would primarily pertain to temporal 
restrictions to ensure compliance with yearly and seasonal load limits. For example, a 
wintertime allocation could not be purchased for use in summertime. Nor could an 
allocation for one year be purchased for use in a different year.92 
Regulator oversight of district and farm pollution discharges is similar under 
tradable permit and traditional permit systems, because the ability to monitor and enforce 
pollution discharge limits is central to each. This can be accomplished by monitoring 
pollution load outputs at the district level or mentoring irrigation water inputs (as a 
surrogate) at the farm level in the manner described above for traditional permits. 
4. Fees
The types of fee programs that could be used to regulate drainage in the 
Grasslands include both effluent and input fees, inasmuch as both drainage outputs and 
irrigation inputs can be monitored and enforced, and both are directly correlated with 
drainage generation. Water pricing requires monitoring water supply or water use and 
90. Thus use of the term “cost-sharing” occurs in the literature on tradable
permit system. See TIETENBERG, supra note 39. It does not refer to cost-sharing between 
the federal government and state or local agencies. 
91. A number of additional factors are important in determining the feasibility of using
tradable discharge permits, including a clear definition of the nature of permits to be traded, the 
“thickness” of the market (e.g., the number of players), and market structure and operations. A 
discussion of these factors is presented later in this chapter in relation to a proposed tradable 
permit system among water districts in the Grasslands region. 
92. These restrictions are required in the Grasslands as a result of the variable flows of 
the San Joaquin River. It is likely that similar temporal restrictions would apply to other regions 
adopting trading programs where the wasteload allocation varies with river flow. 
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establishing a relationship between water inputs and drainage outputs. Effluent fees 
require monitoring effluent quantity and quality. Effluent fees also could be based on an 
"input surrogate," making them substantially equivalent to input fees, as well as 
enforceable as a pollution control requirement. 
Effluent fees would be levied on agricultural drainage discharges at the 
farm or district level based on measurements at an identified ditch, sump, or 
other discharge point. At noted above, measurements of district discharges 
already are available and either could be instituted for individual farms or could 
be estimated based on a surrogate measurement. The fee could be imposed on 
pollutant loads (e.g., pounds of selenium) or drainage flows, although the latter 
requires the determination of a relationship between flows and loads. District-
level fees would be set by the regulatory agency; farm-level fees would be set 
either by the regulatory agency or by districts.93 
The level of the effluent fee initially would be based on estimates of the 
additional cost necessary to cause water districts and farmers to reduce pollution 
loads enough to meet environmental goals. The fee level could be adjusted if the 
load reductions affected by the initial fee was insufficient to meet the pollution 
objective, if the number of irrigated acres in the region increases, or if changes in 
other economic factors caused farmers to use more or less water. 
Input fees would be levied by the responsible agency and correlated with 
the pollution limits to be regulated.94 To make an input fee program most 
effective, groundwater (which currently is not metered) would have to be 
accounted for. Similarly, because water transfers play an increasing role in the 
distribution of agricultural water supplies in California, this source of water 
inputs also would have to be considered. To date, these water substitutes have 
not been price-competitive with scheduled surface water deliveries. 
Input and effluent fees may be imposed either as a flat fee or as a block-rate 
(or "tiered" fee) that increases with the size of the pollution load. In effect, 
increasing block-rate fees are a graduated tax, with higher end-rate surcharges 
compensating for lower initial-block rates. Compared to a uniform, across-the-
board surcharge, tiered fees are a less efficient incentive. With a uniform 
surcharge, the marginal cost of pollution (or marginal benefit of water 
conservation) is equal across all farms. With tiered water rates, the marginal 
93. Again, assignment and collection of fees can also be performed by a
Regional Drainage District. See discussion infra Part V. 
94. The importance of water pricing as a tool for correcting drainage-related
water quality problems is corroborated by several studies and, to a lesser extent, by 
district practices. A study on irrigation-induced water quality problems by the National 
Research Council concluded that “the most pervasive economic issue contributing to 
irrigation-related water quality problems and affecting the choice and success of 
solutions is the cost of water.” NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, IRRIGATION-INDUCED WATER 
QUALITY PROBLEMS: WHAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM THE SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY EXPERIENCE (1989). 
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benefit varies according to the level of use, with the result that some farmers have 
less incentive than others to adopt equally efficient conservation measures. 
Another issue critical to the use of fees is the ultimate disposition of the 
revenues collected through the fee system. Fees collected by a government 
agency typically do not remain within the community. Alternatives for returning 
revenues back to the community (according to a formula that does not negate 
the incentive) might increase the acceptance of a fee-based program. For 
example, districts could use revenues to fund a “bank” that guarantees loans for 
capital-intensive improvements in irrigation systems, to finance land fallowing, 
or to provide environmental enhancement or mitigation. Some portion of the 
fees also could be used to fund the operation of a Regional Drainage District.95 
B. Comparison of Regulator Options
A successful pollution control program for the Grasslands region must meet 
two goals: (1) Pollution reduction targets must be achieved. (2) The regulatory 
system should be easy to implement and to administer. These goals, and by 
extension the interests of each of the major stakeholders, can be formalized into a 
set of criteria that provide a framework for evaluating regulator options: 
• ability to meet the environmental goal;
• cost-effectiveness;
• compatibility with the regulated community;
• equity;
• verifiability; and
• ease of administration.
Evaluation of the regulatory options discussed above on the basis of these
criteria demonstrates that a system of tradable discharge permits offers the best 
means of addressing the drainage problem in the Grassland region. 
95. See discussion infra Part V.
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1. Ability to Meet the Environmental Goal
In the Grasslands region, and in other areas where water quality standards 
currently are not met, the dominant regulatory objective is to comply with a specific 
load allocation, or pollution "cap." Among the options considered by this Article, 
only the traditional permit and tradable permit programs are explicitly designed to 
meet a loading cap. BMPs and fees enforce a cap indirectly by altering irrigation 
practices. The ability of these programs to meet the specific target depends, 
however, on the accuracy of the program design. Unfortunately, such accuracy is 
difficult to achieve, because of the physical heterogeneity (in the case of BMPs) and 
economic heterogeneity (in the case of fees) of the farming industry. 
Meeting the cap with BMPs or fees is rendered even more difficult by the 
nature of the pollution abatement options. Pollution is reduced by increasing 
irrigation efficiency. The efficiency of irrigation practices depends, however, both 
on the technology (equipment that is verifiable) and on how the technology is 
used and maintained (factors that are not readily verifiable). The wide variation 
in drainage output that results from using the same equipment and different 
management levels (see Figure 4) makes it difficult to choose a BMP or fee to 
meet a specific target. For example, a regulator might require a relatively 
affordable BMP or fee and risk exceeding the pollution cap by a dramatic 
margin. Alternatively, the regulator might require a more sophisticated 
technology to increase the probability of meeting the pollution cap, which 
would significantly increase the costs of pollution control.96 
96. More specifically, in the Grasslands, a BMP program designed to meet an average farm-
level goal of 0.25 af/ac/yr of ADP might require cotton farmers to use surge irrigation with quarter-
mile furrows (Surge-4) and risk exceeding the pollution cap by as much as 250%. Alternatively, a 
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In short, reliance on BMPs or fees to achieved pollution goals poses an 
implicit tradeoff between affordability and effectiveness. This tradeoff, which is 
clear in the Grasslands, refutes the widespread assertion that tradable discharge 
permits necessarily compromise environmental protection and that BMPs and 
fees are a preferable means to accomplish pollution reduction. 
Under a system of tradable permits, meeting the environmental goal would 
not be as problematic. Permit programs are explicitly designed to guarantee that the 
pollution cap is met (assuming the program is enforced), so they do not depend on 
predictions of how a technology will be managed or on estimates of the effects of 
fees.97 They also do not require farmers to implement any specific technology, but 
instead allow them to select among all of the available irrigation technology and 
management options. The farmer therefore has the flexibility to choose the system 
best suited to site-specific conditions and to operate it in accordance with changing 
wet and dry year pollution-reduction goals. Individual dischargers also have the 
option to buy and to sell pollution discharge allocations, provided that the sum of 
the allocations (and therefore discharges) remains unchanged.98 With this flexibility, 
a tradable permit program avoids the tradeoff between environmental effectiveness 
and cost-effectiveness. 
A common criticism of tradable permit systems arises, however, where 
pollution discharges from one source are more damaging to the environment 
than are discharges from another source, because of proximity to a sensitive 
receptor. Under these circumstances, a trading system might result in the 
reallocation of pollution discharges to areas where the pollution is more 
damaging. In river basins, this often is referred to as the "upstream-
downstream" problem. Environmental harm and injury to public health also 
could result from trades if pollutants became concentrated at one location, or 
pollution "hot spot."99 
Under these conditions, tradable permits could meet an overall pollution 
cap but would not provide the same amount of environmental protection as a 
regulator might require linear-move sprinklers (a more sophisticated and expense technology), be 
fairly sure of meeting the pollution cap, and nearly double the cost of pollution control. 
97. In the case of trading programs between point and nonpoint sources, it has been
argued that trade involving nonpoint sources compromise pollution control because of the 
uncertainties inherent in regulating these sources. This observation pertains only to situations 
where specific effluent limits (for point sources) are “traded” for BMP implementation (for 
nonpoint sources), however, and the performance of BMPs varies according to site-specific 
conditions and implementation. See Bartfeld, supra note 16. 
98. The advantage of this flexibility for responding to changing environmental
goals can be capture explicitly in the design of a permit trading program. For example, 
a trading system can be devised to include two or more types of permits, 
corresponding to the allocations available during different year types. 
99. TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 53.
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traditional permit system.100 Such problems could be minimized by 
appropriately defining the geographical boundaries for trading, by assigning 
weighting factors to account for upstream-downstream locations, and by 
restricting trades quantitatively to avoid hot spots.101 
In the Grasslands, these problems do not arise, however, because all of 
the drainage from the region is collected into one or two channels well 
upstream of where they enter the San Joaquin River. Thus, trading among 
agricultural dischargers upstream of the points of discharge to the river would 
not alter the effects of the discharge on the river.102 
2. Cost-Effectiveness
The costs of a regulatory program can be measured either in terms of the 
costs to the regulated community or the total costs to society (which also 
include the costs of administering the regulatory program and the costs to other 
affected parties).103 In practice, however, the costs to the regulated community 
are most often the principal determinant of public acceptance of a given 
program. Accordingly, the appropriate cost criterion for comparing regulatory 
100. T.H. TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS (1988). 
Indeed, in some situations, the heterogeneity of marginal environmental costs of 
pollution loading may argue against incentive-based programs. 
101. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 37. 
102. There is some scientific uncertainty over the biological uptake of selenium
during the transport of drainage discharges through local ditches and canals to the 
ultimate point of discharge to the river. If these load losses actually are occurring, 
however, they most likely take place downstream from the last major discharger. As a 
result, trades would have little bearing on these losses. In the absence of definitive 
information on this question, this study assumes, conservatively, that there is no selenium 
uptake in the channels, and that the ratio of selenium in agricultural discharges to the 
selenium load discharged to the River is 1:1. See also P. PICKETT & C. KRATZER, AN EVALUATION OF 
DRAINAGE REDUCTION AS A METHOD FOR MEETING RECOMMENDED WATER QUALITY OBJECTIVES FOR
SELENIUM, SALINITY, AND BORON IN THE SAN JOAQUIN RIVER (1988). 
103. The cost-benefit analysis can also be used to determine the desired level of
pollution abatement under the different regulator methods. Such an analysis does not 
presuppose that pollution control will be adopted. It is difficult, however, to quantify many of 
the components of the costs and benefits of pollution abatement—e.g., the non-pecuniary 
costs to the regulated community of reduced flexibility; the amenity value of improved water 
quality or enhanced fish and wildlife habitat. Moreover, subsidies and market barriers often 
distort the value of the resource in question. For example, state and federal water policy 
subsidizes water prices for agricultural customers, thereby distorting the scarcity cost of water 
and the capital, operations, and maintenance costs of developing and delivering irrigation 
supplies. Given the uncertainties involved in environmental valuation, a thorough cost-benefit 
analysis is not possible for most regulator actions. 
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options for the Grasslands region is the cost of the regulated community of 
achieving the pollution cap.104 
Incentive programs such as tradable permits and fees are cost-effective, 
because they encourage each discharger to control pollution to the point at 
which the marginal cost of abatement is equal to the marginal benefit. Within 
the industry as a whole, pollution control costs are distributed according to the 
response of individual dischargers to the market signals or fees. 
With a tradable permit system, farmers with low pollution costs are 
encouraged to abate more than the average amount required and benefit from 
selling excess allowances; farmers with higher pollution control costs are 
allowed to abate less than the average amount required and to purchase the 
necessary additional allowances. By allowing farmers with the lowest costs to 
abate the most, the tradable permit system, in effect, "buys" the desired level of 
pollution control at the lowest possible price. 
Theoretically, fee-based systems also take advantage of marginal cost 
difference. Here, farmers with low pollution control costs are likely to abate 
more in order to avoid paying fees, while framers with higher pollution control 
costs likely will abate less and pay greater fees. Again, the aggregate pollution 
control costs for the community should be minimized. 
In practice, however, tradable permit systems are more likely to result in 
cost-effective regulation than fee-based systems. This is true because pollution 
allowance trading allows the separation of "who pollutes" and "who pays" in a 
regional system of cost-sharing, which improves the changes that the 
theoretical cost savings will be realized. Moreover, under a fee-based system, 
farmers pay both for pollution control and for pollution. Only if revenues from 
pollution fees were rebated as a lump sum to the community (without 
undermining pollution control incentives) would the total cost to the regulated 
community of fees and tradable permits be comparable.105 
In contrast, uniform pollution abatement requirements such as BMPs do not 
distinguish among the costs to individual dischargers, nor do they allow pollution 
control costs to be redistributed among dischargers. Consequently, BMPs cost the 
regulated community more than a comparable incentive-based program for 
achieving any pollution goal.106 The differences in marginal pollution control costs 
among dischargers are the source of cost savings under all incentive-based systems; 
the magnitude of potential cost savings is a function of the magnitude of the 
104. An analysis of cost-effectiveness determines how to achieve a specific
object with the greatest economic efficiency. In this cast, a cost-effectiveness analysis 
determines how to allocate responsibility for pollution control in a way that minimizes 
costs to the regulated community. 
105. The indirect costs of the two systems might still differ, depending upon, for
example, the need to adjust the fee in response to changes in economic conditions. 
106. TIETENBERG, supra note 100; Stavins and Whitehead, supra note 38; HAHN &
NOLL, YEAR 2000,  supra note 39. 
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marginal cost differences among dischargers. Thus, significant cost savings have 
been predicted in the point/nonpoint source permit trading programs studied to 
date, where industries facing very high control costs (the point sources) are expected 
to trade with unregulated nonpoint source industries that have not yet made any 
pollution control investments and, therefore, still face relatively low marginal 
pollution control costs.107 In the Grasslands region, however, all the sources to be 
regulated are in a single industry. Therefore, significant cost savings can be 
expected, not as a result of dramatic cost differences among industries, but as a 
result of aggregating a large number of relatively small cost differences within the 
regulated community.108 
To determine whether these cost savings would be significant, it is 
necessary to compare the costs of using tradable discharge permits and BMPs 
to achieve a regional pollution control objective. Because drainage abatement is 
accomplished by improving irrigation efficiency, irrigation system costs are used 
to compare pollution control costs under the programs. As a result, some of the 
costs attributed to the two regulatory systems are actually routine costs of 
farming and do not represent the costs due to environmental regulation. 
The results indicate that use of tradable discharge permits or fees among 
districts can yield a savings of up to twenty-three percent, depending on the 
pollution control target. Application of these economic incentives both among 
districts and within districts may yield even great savings, again depending 
upon the particular pollution target (Figure 5). Regardless of the pollution goal 
chose, however, BMPs always appear to be less cost-effective than the economic 
incentive options (Figure 6).109 
3. Compatibility with the Regulated Community
The tradition of independence in farming argues for a regulatory approach 
that is flexible and decentralized. Moreover, the agricultural industry is diverse 
and is influenced by a number of external and variable factors, including crop 
market conditions (e.g., prices and contracts); climate; water supply, quality, and 
cost; energy prices; interest rates; and regulatory requirements. From the 
farmers' point of view, therefore, the optimum regulatory program would allow 
decisions about pollution control to be made in conjunction with other 
production decisions related to these variables. 
All of the incentive-based options discussed above would allow farmers 
and water districts flexibility to adjust pollution control decisions to respond to 
107. Bartfeld, supra note 16; YANDLE, supra note 39; APOGEE RESEARCH, INC., supra
note 37; APOGEE: DILLON, supra note 42; APOGEE: TAR-PAMLICO, supra note 42. 
108. The actual savings with trades may be limited by the capital constraints on
farmers in the short term. In the long term, however, actual savings will be greater as 
capital constraints are overcome. TIETENBERG, supra note 39. 
109. For a more detailed analysis, see YOUNG & CONGDON, supra note 50. 
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changing conditions. This is because economic incentives rely on price signals 
to determine when and how much to reduce discharges; yet they also allow 
farms to decide the optimal method of compliance. Thus, the preservation of 
flexibility under an incentive-based program does not imply a compromise in 
effective pollution control. Pollution control can be achieved without "telling 
farmers how to farm." 
In contrast, a centralized program of mandatory BMPs is unlikely to satisfy 
the farmer's preference for flexibility and independence and still be effective in 
meeting the environmental goal. The common perception that BMP programs 
are flexible is due mostly to the use of broadly-defined BMPs. Where 
requirements are general enough to be adaptable to a wide range of conditions, 
however, they also tend to undermine the ability of BMP programs to meet 
pollution control objectives. If more specific requirements are employed (e.g., 
managed technological improves), BMPs are likely to be objectionable to 
farmers for two reasons. First, they do not take into account the significant 
physical and economic differences among farms. Second, they may inhibit the 
ability of farmers to respond to changing economic, environmental, or 
technological conditions because of "sunk" capital costs. 
267 
 West  Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008 
Incentive-based programs also provide a direct financial incentive (e.g., avoided 
costs of effluent or input fees or supplemental income gained from the sale of discharge 
permits) to reduce discharges below the required level or to invest in improved control 
technologies.110 In contrast, technology-based BMPs could discourage experimentations 
110. A frequently cited advantage of incentive programs is that they encourage the
discovery of more effective and less costly abatement technologies and/or practices by the 
dischargers who have the best knowledge of and experience with abatement options, and who stand 
to gain from such innovations. See, M. Crooper & W.E. Oates, Environmental Economics: A Survey, 30 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE 675 (1992);  TIETENBERG, supra note 39. This advantage was 
demonstrated when the recent drought and changing economic conditions caused some farmers in 
the Central Valley to innovate. For example, in 1985, most framers in the Grasslands region used 
half-mile furrows at a low management level to irrigate row crops such as cotton. By 1992—after six 
years of drought, during which water deliveries eventually were reduced by more than half and 
districts adopted tiered water pricing and other conservation-oriented programs—90% of the 
farmers growing cotton in Broadview Water District had adopted quarter-mile furrows, 28% were 
irrigation alternate furrows, and most had reduced pre-irrigation. Similar changes were observed for 
tomato and melon farmers in the district. These innovations are similar to measures taken by 
farmers in the other districts in response to the 1986-1992 drought. Other responses included crop 
switching, improved irrigation scheduling at the farm level, and changes in district water delivery 
schedules. N. MACDOUGAL ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURAL DRAINAGE (1992); S. Archibald, An 
Economic Analysis of Water Availability in California Central Valley Agriculture, Testimony to the State Water 
Resources Control Board During the Consideration of Interim Water Rights Actions (June 26, 1992). 
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with new technologies, because successful demonstration of more efficient controls 
might lead to a new, more stringent standard. 
4. Equity
The goal of an equitable regulatory program is to ensure that each 
polluter is responsible for his or her share of the required level of pollution 
abatement.111 In the Grasslands, disagreements over the sources of subsurface 
drainage could lead to perception that pollution control assignments are unfair. 
The problem arises from the common assumption that unmeasured quantities 
of subsurface drainage water migrate downslope.112 Although experts dispute 
the significance of this lateral migration, the potential for perceived inequities 
must be accounted for when allocated responsibility for drainage management 
among water districts and individual farmers.113 
Programs that rely on direct measurement and enforcement of farm-level 
drainage outputs will appear inequitable if the quantities of subsurface drainage 
collected from a given field or farm do not correspond to the amount of drainage 
generated in that location. Effluent fees and tradable discharge permits can use 
water inputs as a surrogate for drainage outputs, however, and thereby avoid this 
problem. Similarly, either farm-level BMPs or farm-level input fees can avoid 
penalizing farmers who may be the recipients of other's pollution. Any of the 
regulatory programs implemented at the district level also can compensate for an 
"upslope-downslope" problem by using historical (unregulated) discharges as the 
basis for assigning pollution control responsibility.114 
"Equity" also can be achieved by equalizing the costs of pollution abatement for 
dischargers. Uniform, technology-based BMPs appear to be equitable, because all 
regulated parties must invest in the same control measures. In practice, however, a system 
111. The principal concern about equity is the question of “who pays” for pollution control. 
The issue can be defined broadly to include potential impacts on consumers and farm-related 
industries as well as on the agricultural community. To the extent that changes in drainage 
management result in substitutions in irrigation practices or otherwise increase the “costs of doing 
business,” these costs may be passed on to consumers or related businesses. 
112. Disputes over drainage generation between the upslope lands within the
Westlands Water District and downslope lands within the several low-lying districts of 
the Grassland region have been subject to various and ongoing legal proceedings. 
113. To some extent, the “upslope-downslope” problem can also be addressed
through institutional means. For example, the downslope districts in the Grasslands have 
organized themselves informally as the “Grasslands Basin Drainers” for purposes of 
participating in various drainage management projects. This institutional capacity for 
address this and other perceived sources of inequity among dischargers would be 
enhanced with the creation of a regional drainage district comprised of all the 
contributing sources in the region. Institutional considerations are the subject of Part V. 
114. See discussions supra Part III. 
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of mandatory BMPs may have significantly different economic effects on individual farmers 
because of variations in other production factors, in physical conditions, and in profit 
margins.115 Incentive-based programs by contrast, tend to equalize marginal costs but 
enable dischargers to adopt different levels of pollution control. 
Among incentive-based programs, one of the primary equity considerations 
involved the transfer of wealth out of the community. For fee-based programs, the 
ultimate disposition of revenues collected is often at issue. Typically, effluent and input 
fees result in a net transfer of wealth out of the community in the form of payments to 
the government. If a program were designed in which the fees were imposed on farmers 
by the water district, then the revenues would remain within the regulated community. 
Because pollution sources in the Grasslands region currently are 
unregulated, the initial allocation of discharge permits represents a significant 
assignment of wealth. Whether this wealth remained within the regulated 
community or is transferred out of the community to a regulatory agency would 
depend on the program design. Allocation methods that involve no net transfer 
of wealth to the government include: (1) revenue-neutral auctions, in which the 
proceeds collected from the initial auction of discharge permits are 
redistributed to the community in one way or another; and (2) 
"grandfathering"—a method of distributing allowances according to acreage or 
historical patters of discharge. The latter option is more likely  to be supported 
by the Grasslands region.116 Indeed, an initial allocation based on historical 
discharges would mean that few, if any, of the dischargers would have to 
assume costs for pollution abatement greater than the costs they would face 
under a traditional permit program or fee system.117 
Once the initial allocation is complete, the revenues from a trading 
program automatically stay within the community and are transferred among 
participating farmers or districts as a form of cost-sharing. Regionwide, all 
sources participate in financing pollution control, but some are buyers and 
some are sellers of permits. 
5. Verifiability
An essential component of a successful regulatory program of any kind is 
the ability to verify that farmers and districts are complying with pollution 
control requirements. Verification of farm-level BMPs is relatively simple, 
because BMPs usually consist of prescribed technologies or farm management 
techniques. In contrast, traditional permit programs, tradable discharge permits, 
115. Potential equity problems also may arise with performance-based BMPs in
the Grasslands where returns to farm-level land and management vary because of high 
water table effects. See D. Wichelns & M. Weighberg, Economics of Agricultural Drainage 
Policies, 44 CAL. AGRICULTURE 8 (1990). 
116. See discussion, supra Part III (regarding equity effects of allocation options). 
117. See TIETENBERG, supra note 39 (discussing the distribution of financial burdens). 
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and other incentive-based programs must provide some collateral means of 
measuring and verifying farm-level pollution. 
In the Grasslands region, verification of compliance with a permit or a fee 
program would require direct measurement of drainage outputs or indirect 
measurement using water inputs as a surrogate. In this region, subsurface 
drainage is collected in sumps that correspond to several fields or farms. The 
drainage then flows to collector drains and is subsequently discharged from the 
district at an identifiable point. Most surface drainage (i.e. tailwater) is collected 
and recycled at the farm level,118 but some surface drainage (which contains little 
selenium) is blended with the subsurface drainage within the districts. District 
discharges then flow through a labyrinth of ditches before they are conveyed to 
the San Joaquin River via Mud Slough and Salt Slough.119 
A monitoring and metering system is in place to measure the combined 
surface and subsurface drainage outputs, both at the district discharge points 
and at the points of discharge to the two sloughs and the San Joaquin River. The 
current monitoring system makes it possible to verify drainage outputs 
(including selenium loads) at the district level. Indeed, monitoring data have 
been collected on a monthly basis at district outlets since 1985.120 
Drainage outputs are not measured at the individual farm level in most 
districts. To determine drainage outputs from farms, improved drainage 
collection and monitoring could be installed, but only at considerable 
expense.121 A far easier and less expensive option for farm-level metering would 
be to use water inputs as a surrogate for drainage outputs.122 Many districts 
already meter water inputs at the field level, and recent federal and state polices 
for improved water management include metering requirements.123 Monitoring 
118. Most if not all districts in the Grasslands require farmers to employ
tailwater return systems as a matter of district policy. 
119. See discussion supra Part II; see also YOUNG & CONGDON, supra note 50. 
120. GRASSLAND WATER TASK FORCE, GRASSLAND AREA MONITORING REPORT (1989) 
(hereinafter “GRASSLANDS 1989 REPORT”); GRASSLAND WATER TASK FORCE, GRASSLAND AREA 
MONITORING REPORT (1990) (hereinafter “GRASSLAND 1990 REPORT”). 
121. Presently, approximately one half of the acreage in the Grasslands region is
underlain by subsurface tile collection systems that convey drainage by gravity to 
sumps serving several fields and/or farms. Distinguishing the discharges of individual 
farms would require either reconfiguration of the collection systems with sumps for 
each field (or farm) or drainage flow measurements at each farm boundary. 
122. The surrogate does not account for the relative selenium contamination of drain water 
from different fields, unlike a direction measurement of drainage flow and selenium concentration. 
However, average shallow groundwater contaminant levels could be used to weight the water input 
measurements. See discussion of input surrogates earlier in this Part. 
123. Section 3405(b) of CVIPA requires measurement of water delivers for all
surface water delivery systems within a contracting district’s boundaries. At the state 
level, agricultural districts have been negotiating a Memorandum of Understanding 
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of surface water deliveries would have to be combined with monitoring of 
groundwater use to account for all irrigation inputs.124 
In sum, the monitoring and enforcement requirements of any program 
could be met at the district level under existing conditions. BMPs and input fees 
would be readily verifiable at the farm level, as well. A tradable permit or 
effluent fee program would be verifiable with improvements in farm-level 
drainage metering capacity. If groundwater were metered, however, 
measurement of water inputs as a surrogate for drainage discharges would be 
preferable at the farm level. 
6. Ease of Administration
Agricultural pollution cannot be regulated effectively unless individual 
farmers become responsible for pollution control. This requirement gives rise to 
the most frequently cited obstacle to any system of regulation of agricultural 
pollution—viz. the administrative difficulty of tracking and enforcing hundreds 
or thousands of individual discharges. Just as an incentive-based program is 
more compatible with the needs of the regulated community, administrative 
burdens also would be minimized under a regulatory program that provides 
incentives to farmers to make independent decisions that collectively meet the 
environmental goal.125 
Both tradable permits and fee-based systems equate the farmer's 
economic self-interest with environmental protection by provided financial 
rewards for reducing pollution. By motivating farmers to comply with pollution 
reduction requirements, incentive systems should minimize the enforcement 
burden.126 In contrast, BMP and traditional permit programs rely solely on threat 
of enforcement to assure compliance. 
Another key to reducing the administrative burden is to build on existing 
institutions and existing programs as much as possible.127 Existing water supply 
and drainage districts are a logical choice to administer any of the proposed 
drainage regulatory programs, because they already perform similar 
(hereinafter “MOU”) for improved water management that includes metering of water 
delivers. CAL. WATER CODE § 10903 (West Supp. 1995)/ 
124. Groundwater is used by farmers in every water district to supplement
surface water delivers and can readily be monitored based on direct flow 
measurements of electricity use at pumping locations. 
125. Other requirements for establishing accountability at the farm level are
discussed in Part V. 
126. For the same reasons, incentive systems arguable speed the initial
compliance with the regulatory limits. See TIETENBERG, supra note 39. 
127. For example, the rice herbicide control program in the Sacramento Valley
of California is “piggybacked” on an existing record-keeping and enforcement system 
run by another agency. 
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administrative functions and have well-developed relationships with individual 
farmers.128 In addition, much of the necessary legal authority for undertaking 
these pollution control responsibilities is already in place.129 Districts also could 
implement BMPs or input fees at the farm level with comparative ease. 
In contrast, effluent fees would require additional monitoring and perhaps the 
development of an input surrogate. Tradable permits at the farm level would be 
more cumbersome to administer because of the additional reporting requirements 
and the need to coordinate and oversee transactions among farmers. 
Implementation by the RWQCB of any of the district-level regulatory 
programs discussed here would be fairly simple  given the limited number of 
entities involved and the ease of monitoring both drainage outputs and water 
inputs.130 Administration of a system of tradable discharge permits, however, 
could require additional regulator involvement, depending upon the program 
design. The critical issues for designing an effective tradable permit program are 
discussed in the following section. 
C. A Tradable Discharge Permit System for the Grasslands
As shown in Table 10, a district-level tradable discharge permit program 
would be satisfy each of the criteria described at the outset of this section: 
128. Existing drainage districts and water districts currently have varying degrees of
authority over and involvement in drainage management. Most of these public entities have 
some drainage policies in place, including mandatory tailwater recycling at the farm-level, 
moratoria on district financing of additional subsurface drainage systems, annual drainage 
management fees, and metering of water inputs. A number of districts are managing drainage far 
more intensively than others. For example, Broadview Water District has developed a data 
management system to keep track of farm-level water use, drainage quantity and quality at 
individual sumps, and crop production. BROADVIEW WATER DISTRICT, supra note 84. This system is 
compatible with the monitoring requirements of the incentive-based pollution control programs. 
Similarly, farmers are required to submit annual crop plans to the district prior to the pre-
irrigation season. The plans currently are used to inform farmers of the practices and efficiencies 
of their neighbors in order to encourage greater efficiency district-wide. This approach could be 
broadened to include reporting of irrigation technologies, with a schedule of district verification, 
under a BMP program. 
129. See discussion infra Part V.
130. The drainage operation plans already required of each water district could provide a
framework for administering district level programs. Drainage operation plans might have to be 
amended to include more specific and mandatory reporting guidelines. From the district’s perspective, 
many of the administrative requirements of a drainage management program could be integrated with 
existing activities, such as water contract renewals and water conservation planning requirements for 
water districts served by the CVPIA §§ 3404 & 3405(e), or they could be implemented as part of the 
proposed MOU agricultural water suppliers regarding the implementation of Efficient Water 
Management Practices. CAL. WATER CODE § 10903 (West Supp. 1995). 
273 
 West  Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008 
• The allocation of tradable permits among districts would be based
on a predetermined pollution cap to ensure that the water quality
objectives for selenium in the San Joaquin River are met in different
water-year types and irrigation seasons.
• The cost-effectiveness of this program stems from the reliance on
incentives to encourage a cost-minimizing allocation of pollution
control responsibility among districts (using tradable permits) and
farmers (using input fees).
• The decision-making flexibility afforded by this program, including
the opportunity for each district to determine the most appropriate
system of tiered water prices, conforms to the characteristics and
preferences of the regulated community.
• Equity issues related to the "upslope-downslope" migration of
subsurface drainage and to differences in past investments in
pollution control would be addressed through the initial allocation
of permits among districts and the opportunities for cost-sharing
among districts and, by extension, among their farmers.
• Compliance with the water quality standard in the river and with the
district load limits established through trades is verifiable with the
existing mentoring system in the grasslands. At the farm level,
monitoring of water deliveries (which can be correlated with drainage
discharges) is widely practiced and is likely to increase in response to
other legal requirements and policies.
• While the introduction of any regulatory program would create new
responsibilities for the regulatory agency, the incentive structure of
the proposed program, its compatibility with existing agricultural
programs and policies, and the familiarity of regulators with permit
systems and tiered water pricing all work to minimize the burden on
regulators and districts. The creation of a regional drainage district to
oversee the program would further ease the administrative burden.131
131. See discussion infra Part V.
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How the trading system would function in practice, or whether it would work 
at all, depends of course on how the program is implemented and administered. 
An extensive body of literature describes the conditions required for an effective 
tradable permit program.132 In terms relevant to the Grasslands, they are: 
1. a defined environmental goal;
2. a potential for cost savings based on differences in marginal
pollution control costs among farmers;
3. the capability to identify and quantify agricultural pollution sources;
4. the ability accurately to monitor discharges to ensure compliance
with permit transactions and with the regional pollution cap;
5. knowledge of the relationship between effluent discharges and water
quality consequences so that the problems of "upstream-
downstream" effects and "hot spots" can be avoided;
6. market structure and market operation that minimize transaction costs; 
7. a sufficient number or participants for a fluid market; and
8. a competitive market.
The first five requirements are met in the Grasslands, as demonstrated by
the analysis in the preceding section. The remaining conditions for a functioning 
market must be addressed in the design of the proposed regulatory program. 
132. See e.g., Cropper & Oates, supra note 110; TIETENBERG, supra note 39; HAHN & NOLL, 
MARKET DESIGN, supra note 30; 1982b; YANDLE, supra note 30; J. Tripp & D.J. Dudek, Institutional 
Guidelines for Designing Successful Transferable Rights Programs, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 383 (1989). 
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1. Minimizing Transaction Costs133
In a trading program for the Grasslands region, transaction costs would be 
voluntarily incurred. If the initial allocation of discharge permits is generally 
equitable and acceptable to the regulated districts, few transactions will occur, 
and market participants will be no worse off under the tradable permit system 
than they would have been under a mandatory program to reduce drainage 
discharges. If districts choose to undertake market transactions to adjust their 
permit allocations, the magnitude of the transaction costs will be a function of 
the availability of information and program administrative requirement. 
Therefore, measures to streamline the flow of information should be 
incorporated into the design of the permit market. 
There is a history of cooperation among water district mangers in the 
Grasslands region that would facilitate dissemination of information about 
permit trading. Search and negotiation costs could be reduced further by relying 
on brokerage services to facilitate transactions.134 In addition to private brokers, 
a regional drainage district or similar entity could help to reduce transaction 
costs by serving as a clearinghouse for information on trading opportunities and 
terms, by maintaining a period schedule for compliance review, and by 
providing a clear definition of the basis for determining violations and penalties 
for noncompliance. 
Permits also should be freely tradable, both through purchases and 
leases. Under the proposed trading program, permit leases may be easier to 
negotiate and therefore result in lower transaction costs than purchase 
transactions. This is likely to be the case for two reasons. First, the permit 
holders (i.e., the districts) do not generate or directly control the pollution that is 
discharged. As a result, the districts would be more likely to negotiate short-
term leasing arrangements than commit to the permanent transfers of farmers' 
pollution allocations. Second, the variability in the allowable pollution load and 
133. The significance of transactions costs for the performance of pollution
markets is discussed in the literature. Analyses of the Fox River pollutant trading 
program cite high transaction costs and uncertainty over the future value of permits as 
the primary reasons for the program’s failure. See Hahn, supra note 38; Bartfeld, supra 
note 16. By contrast, the combination of minimal administrative requirements and 
general familiarity with trading partners is cited as the reason for the high number of 
trades and overall success of EPA’s “inter-refinery averaging” leaded gasoline trading 
program. See Cropper & Oates, supra note 110. 
134. In general, the reliance on a market-maker also hastens the market permit
price towards its equilibrium by facilitating a sufficient number of early transactions. 
HAHN & NOLL, MARKET DESIGN, supra note 39; H. Taylor, Experimental Economics: Putting 
Markets under the Microscope, in BUSINESS REVIEW 15 (1988). 
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the likely reliance on short-term management practices to control pollution 
would tend to increase the number of short-term transactions.135 
From the regulator's perspective, the major transaction cost of a trading 
program is the administrative cost of approving individual trades. In the 
Grasslands, however, there is little need for approval of individual trades, 
because discharges are well-mixed during conveyance in regional drains and are 
indistinguishable at the point of discharge to the San Joaquin River. Thus, the 
rules for trading should limit disapproval of trades to instances where the 
temporal restrictions in the permit have been violated. 
2. Market Size
In theory, if a market has too few players (what economists call a "thin" market), 
transactions may be few and infrequent, leading to higher and more variable permit 
prices.136 In a thin market, adverse market behavior by one or more districts also can 
result in fewer trades and higher transaction costs for each trade. 
A trading program among water districts in the Grasslands would involve 
a minimum of seven participants—the water districts that currently discharge to 
the San Joaquin River via Mud Slough and Salt Slough. While a market of this 
size generally is considered thin, seven participants probably is a sufficient 
number to achieve a cost-effective distribution of pollution control.137 Moreover, 
because transactions at the district level would be a function of the actions of a 
far greater number of farmers, the potential for adverse market behavior would 
be minimized.138 
135. TIETENBERG, supra note 39. 
136. HAHN & NOLL, MARKET DESIGN, supra note 39. 
137. Personal Communication with L. Goulder, Professor, Department of
Economics, Stanford University (1992); Personal Communication with J. Merrifield, 
Professor, Division of Economics, University of Texas, San Antonio (1993); Personal 
Communication with D. Mussatti, Economist, Economist, U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, RTP, NC (1993). See also YANDLE, supra note 39 (suggesting that market size is less 
important to market success than the security of the tradable permits). 
138. In general, the number of players in the market may be larger than the number or 
permit holders if parties that do not participate in the initial allocation nevertheless participate in 
the market. A farm-level trading program—which would involve all farmers within the boundaries 
of the Grasslands region or farmers within individual districts—would result in a substantially 
larger market, with potentially more than 1000 participants. In the case of the Grasslands region, 
the market could be expanded to include additional players, such as the Grasslands Water 
District (a water supplier to private wetlands), unincorporated agricultural lands, portions of the 
Westlands Water District, or other entities. 
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3. Market Competitiveness
Price competitiveness is the sine qua non of a functioning market. To be 
efficient, the market rules and the value of permits traded in it must be well-
established. Uncertainty about allowable pollution loads, for example, would 
erode the value of the permits traded and undermine credibility in the market. 
In the Grasslands, however, the variations in river flows and effluent flows are 
taken into account in the regional loading analysis and would be reflected in the 
terms of each permit, thus minimizing insecurity over the value of allocated 
permits. 
There are several ways to preserve the value of permits yet let the permit 
market reflect changes in the allowable pollution loads according to water-year 
type and irrigation season. First, yearly adjustments in the total allowable load 
(and hence the total number of permits) could be accomplished through the 
annual participation of the RWQCB in the market. The Board could sell 
pollution allowances during non-critical water-years to increase the total 
number of permits to conform with the increased allowable load. Revenues 
could be rebated to the market participants to preserve the cost-effectiveness of 
the trading system 
Alternatively, the permits could be allocated according to three 
classifications—one that would allow continuous uninterrupted discharges, and 
two that allow discharges only during the appropriate year-type. Priority 1 permits 
would correspond to the critical-year allocation and would represent discharges that 
could occur on an uninterrupted basis during the appropriate month regardless of 
the type of water year. Priority 2 and Priority 3 permits would correspond to 
discharges that could take place during more favorable hydrologic conditions.139 
Districts would decide their relative demands for these classes of permits based on 
their respective capability to adjust discharges to meet changed loading conditions. 
The determination and announcement to the annual allowable load should be 
timed to coincide as closely as possible with the farmers' crop planning and 
investment schedule, as well as with district operations. 
The competitiveness of the market also is affected by the distribution of 
power within it. If one or a small number of participants controls the majority of 
permits, as either buyers or sellers, there is an incentive to behave non-
competitively, thereby driving up the permit price. The ability of market 
participants to influence the market is principally a function of the method of 
the initial permit allocation. While no single method of allocation is 
recommended, a distribution rule could be selected that would be acceptable to 
the participating district and thus minimize the potential for adverse market 
behavior. If these concerns are accounted for in its design, a tradable permit 
139. See TIETENBERG, supra note 39. Contractual terms of water deliveries at the
wholesale and retailed levels in some districts (e.g., Westlands Water District) include 
similar permit classifications for water supplies. 
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market among water districts in the Grasslands would be feasible, effective, and 
less costly than a more traditional regulatory approach. 
In past projects related to drainage treatment and disposal and in their 
participation in an informal water market, the districts in the Grasslands have 
shown themselves capable of a level of cooperation a new market would require. 
V. THE REGIONAL DRAINAGE DISTRICT
A Regional Drainage District would be the best means of implementing a 
tradable permit system for the discharge of drainage in the Grasslands region. 
Although such a system could be directly imposed on the existing water supply 
and drainage districts by the RWQCB, the creation of a new, regional drainage 
agency would offer the twin advantages of local autonomy and greater 
administrative accountability. 
Any nonpoint source pollution control program—whether based on 
technology standards, performance standards, or economic incentives—must 
have the institutional capacity to make individual sources accountable for the 
pollution they generate. The presumption that nonpoint sources cannot be held 
individually accountable for specific pollution control requirements lies behind 
the exemption in the federal CWA for agricultural drainage and other nonpoint 
sources from direct regulation and has contributed to the lack of institutional 
mechanisms to bring about this accountability. This presumption also is at the 
heart of the present regulatory stalemate in the Grasslands, where individual 
sources of agricultural pollution have not been regulated despite clear authority 
in California law to do so.140 
The regulatory challenge therefore must be redefined. Legal authority must 
be adequate to allow each of these sources to be regulated directly when 
necessary, and the regulatory agency must have an effective mechanism for doing 
so. From the regulator's perspective, the system should be efficient, with as few 
regulated entities to administer and monitor as possible. From the perspective of 
the regulated agricultural community, the program should ensure maximum 
flexibility to take account of farm-level conditions affecting pollution control. 
As a practical matter, accountability also will be enhanced if the regulatory 
system contains an incentive structure that encourages compliance, and if it is 
implemented through institutions over which farmers have substantial 
influence—viz. water and drainage districts. Finally, the regulatory structure 
should be consistent with the regional nature of the pollution problem to be 
solved, because subsurface drainage flows are not necessarily confined to the 
boundaries of a given farm or water district. 
These requirements suggest the need for a regulatory framework that 
includes an intermediate entity (or entities) to provide a link between numerous 
individual pollution sources and the responsible regulatory agency. The 
140. See discussion infra Section A of this part. 
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intermediate entity should be directly accountable to the regulatory agency and 
have clear enforcement authority over the regulated community. At the same 
time, this entity should be controlled by (or otherwise responsive to) the 
regulated community. In this way, the need for centralized authority at the state 
or regional level to ensure compliance is balanced with the efficacy of 
decentralized, site-specific planning and management. 
In the Grasslands region, a Regional Drainage District should be created 
to serve as such an intermediate entity. The Regional Drainage District would 
function essentially as a consortium of existing water agencies and drainage 
districts. The Regional Drainage District would have the authority to represent 
the Grasslands water agencies and farmers before the RWQCB and to 
administer the programs needed to achieve compliance with the environmental 
objectives for the San Joaquin River. With this arrangement, the board would 
not be required to attempt the Herculean task of enforcing effluent limits for 
hundreds of individual sources. Rather, the Regional Drainage District (in 
concert with water agencies and drainage districts) would bridge the regulatory 
"gap" between the RWQCB and farmers. 
Figure 7 depicts the institutional roles proposed for the existing regulatory 
agency (the RWQCB), the Regional Drainage District, the existing water and 
drainage districts, and the individual farmers in the proposed system. The bold 
lines represent the primary and expected paths of supervisorial and 
enforcement power. The light lines represent the fallback means of supervision 
and enforcement. For example, if an existing water or drainage district or 
individual farmer should fail to implement the required effluent reductions, the 
Regional Drainage District (or, if necessary, the RWQCB) could impose 
appropriate sanctions on the agency or on the individual farmer.141 
141. A regulatory program also could be implemented either without direct
regulatory involvement by the Grasslands water and drainage agencies (e.g., if 
adequate legal authority were lacking) or without a regional drainage district (e.g., if a 
new district is not formed). In any case, it is essential that clear legal authority for 
implementation and enforcement of pollution control requirements exist between the 
pollution control agency and the regional and local agencies, as well as each of these 
and the farmers. See GREG A. THOMAS & MICHELLE T. LEIGHTON-SCHWARTZ, LEGAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE FOR MANAGING AGRICULTURAL DRAINAGE IN THE SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY: 
DESIGNING A FUTURE (1990); A. Randall, Alternative Institutional Arrangements for Controlling 
Drainage Pollution, in THE ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT OF WATER AND DRAINAGE IN
AGRICULTURE (A. Dinar et al. eds., 1991) 
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The advantages of this institutional approach are significant. First, the 
RWQCB would have a better chance of bringing the agricultural sources in the 
aggregate into compliance with water quality standards because it could 
concentrate its regulatory efforts on a single entity. The Regional Drainage 
District would be responsible for complying with the load limits set by the 
RWQCB to achieve the ambient water quality standards. Second, farmers would 
remain accountable to the same district mangers with whom they work on a 
daily basis, as well as to one another. In a sense, the Regional Drainage District 
would be analogous to municipal, publicly owned wastewater treatment works, 
except that farmers would be both accountable to the Regional District and in 
control of it through their membership in participating water districts. This 
arrangement would enhance the incentive for the farm community to cooperate 
with the regional pollution-reduction program. Moreover, the Regional Drainage 
District would provide a forum in which the water districts could buy and sell 
discharge allowances if a tradable discharge permit system were adopted.142 
142. If a Regional Drainage District is not formed, the RWQCB itself could assign 
discharge allocations to each of the local districts in the Grasslands region. As 
described earlier, the contribution of each district that provide drainage service to the 
farms is already monitored. Since most of the selenium-laden drainage is discharged 
by seven districts and there are only fourteen drainage agencies in the region, it should 
be administratively feasible for the RWQCB to hold the districts individually 
responsible for meeting the allowed pollution loads. This option would require the 
RWQCB to establish separate effluent limitations for each district’s point(s) of 
discharge, and to enforce the limitations against each district. 
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A. The Legal Basis for Regulation of Agricultural Pollution
Since the enactment of the modern CWA in 1972, the principal focus on 
the nation's water pollution control efforts has been on the regulation of "point 
sources" through an elaborate and expensive set of technology-based effluent 
limitations.143 The "centerpiece" of these effluent controls is the NPDES system, 
pursuant to which the EPA or state water quality boards may issue permits to 
dischargers of pollutants into the surface waters of the United States.144 In 
California, the SWRCB has been granted authority to administer the NPDES 
permit system through the nine regional water quality control boards.145 
The NPDES program covers all "point sources" of water pollution which 
Congress has defined broadly as "any discernible, confined, and discrete 
conveyance[s]."146 Thus, the term "point source" includes discharges through 
pipes, ditches, and channels, and "embrace[s] the broadest possible definition 
of any identifiable conveyance from which pollutants might enter the water of 
the United States."147 The NPDES permit program does not apply to "nonpoint 
sources," which (for lack of a better definition) are all sources of water pollution 
other than point sources.148 
The exemption of nonpoint source pollution from the NPDES permit 
system traditionally has been justified on the theory that it is "diffuse"—i.e., it 
does not enter the surface water system at a discrete and discernable location. 
This in turn creates two problems. First, the scattered nature of the pollution 
renders it impractical to establish effluent limitations. Second, it is difficult, 
perhaps impossible, to race the pollution back to its numerous sources. 
Accordingly, it would be unduly expensive to attempt to regulate each source 
through a permit-based, effluent control system.149 
Neither of these explanations for the exemption of nonpoint sources is 
applicable to the Grasslands region. Virtually all of the return flow from irrigated 
lands in the region enters the San Joaquin River through  an elaborate system of 
tile drains, pipes, canals, and sloughs that easily qualify as "discernable, 
143. See 2 WILLIAM H. ROGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER 372 (1986). 
144. Clean Water Act § 402. 
145. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13160 & 13370-13389 (West 1992). The NPDES permits
issued by the regional boards are known as “waste discharge requirements.” CAL. WATER 
CODE § 13374 (West 1992). 
146. Clean Water Act § 502(14). 
147. United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 559 F.2d 368 (10th Circ. 1979). 
148. See ROGERS, supra note 143, at 147. The California Court of Appeals has state
that “nonpoint sources are defined by obverse inference from the definition of point 
sources.” Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. State Water Resources Control Board, 
210 Cal. App. 1421, 1425 n 2 (1989). 
149. See ROGERS, supra note 143, at 147; Davidson, supra note 141.
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confined, and discrete conveyance[s]" of the pollution.150 Although thousands of 
individual farms generate this tailwater, there are but fourteen local agencies 
that provide drainage services to these farmers. With almost all irrigation return 
flow captured in identifiable conveyance facilities before discharge, it would not 
be difficult to impose effluent limitations on each source at the "point" at which 
it discharges into the San Joaquin River system. Moreover, with only fourteen 
agencies with which to deal, it would not be prohibitively expensive to impose 
WDRs on each agency that provides drainage services. The RWQCB has 
exempted irrigation return flows in the Grasslands region from the NPDES 
program and instead has elected to control drainage indirectly through its water 
quality planning authority.151 
In its 1989 Water Quality Control Plan for the Central Valley Basin, the 
Regional Board established ambient water quality objectives for a variety of 
pollutants, including selenium,152 and announced an array of actions that it and 
other agencies may take to achieved those objectives.153 Among the proposals 
included in the Basin Plan were: 
1. A "favored option" of exporting agricultural drainage out of the basin
through completion of the San Luis Drain or another "valleywide drain."154
2. Imposition of BMPs, which the RWQCB identified as "principally water
conservation measures . . . applicable to the control of agricultural
subsurface drainage."155
3. "Annual submittal and approval of drainage operation plans. . .from all
those discharging or contributing to the generation of agricultural
subsurface drainage from 1989 through 1993."156
4. "As a last resort and where the withholding of irrigation water is the
only means of achieving significant improvements in water quality," a
request to the SWRCB "to use its water rights authority to preclude the
supplying of water to specific lands."157
The RWQCB also stated that it would consider establishment of "waste 
discharge requirements . . . to control agricultural subsurface drainage 
discharges containing toxic trace elements, if water quality objects are not 
150. Clean Water Act § 502(14) 
151. See CAL. WATER CODE §§13240-13247 (West 1995).
152. CENTRAL VALLEY REGIONAL WATER QUALITY CONTROL BOARD, WATER QUALITY 
CONTROL PLAN III-2 to III-9 (1989) (hereinafter “BASIN PLAN”). 
153. Id. at IV-5 to IV-22 
154. Id. at IV-8. 
155. Id. at IV-18. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at IV-15. 
283 
 West  Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008 
achieved" by certain dates.158 Moreover, the Regional Board observed that "[i]f 
fragmentation of the parties that generate, handle and discharge agricultural 
subsurface drainage jeopardizes the achievement of water quality objectives," it 
would consider petitioning the Legislature "for the formation of a regional 
drainage district."159 Although the Regional Board has not yet acted on these 
pronouncements, they mark a significant step toward resolution of the drainage 
problem in the Grasslands region. For the Regional Board has signaled its 
willingness to move beyond traditional ambient water quality and nonpoint 
source regulation, and to use the tools of the NPDES program to create a 
workable system to control irrigation runoff. 
The SWRCB approved the Basin Plan in 1990,160 and one year later 
incorporated the Regional Board's suggestion that WDRs be considered as 
regulatory option to address the drainage problem. In the "Inland Surface 
Waters Plan," the State Board established numerical ambient water quality 
objectives for a variety of pollutants to protect both human health and 
freshwater aquatic life.161 Then, pursuant to its authority under both the CWA 
and the Porter-Cologne Act, the State Board directed the Regional Boards to 
devise "water quality-based" effluent standards for those waters for which the 
existing WDRs are inadequate to achieve the new water quality standards.162 The 
purposes of the latter are to determine the TMDL of each regulated pollutant 
that may be discharged into the watercourse without impairing the ambient 
standards and to limit discharge of pollutants by each source so that aggregate 
discharges do not cause a violation of the ambient standards.163 
Of the three categories of watercourses for which the SWRCB ordered the 
establishment of water quality-based effluent standards, two are present in the 
Grasslands region. The first is Category B watercourses, which the SWRCB 
defined as "[n]atural water bodies, or segments thereof, that. . .are dominated 
by agricultural drainage."164 The second, designated Category C watercourses 
includes "[w]ater bodies, or segments thereof, that . . . have been constructed 
158. Id. at IV-18. The dates were January 1989 for molybdenum; October 1990 for
selenium in the water supply channels for the Grasslands Water District and for state and 
federal wildlife refuges; October 1991 for selenium and boron in the San Joaquin River 
between its confluence with the Merced River to Vernalis; and October 1993 for selenium 
and boron in Salt Slough, Mud Slough, and the remainder of the San Joaquin River. Id. 
159. Id. at IV-16. 
160. RESOLUTION 90-28, supra note 44. Pursuant to its authority under section 303(c)
of the CWA, the EPA has disapproved portions of the Basin Plan—viz., the critical year water 
quality standards and the ambient standards for Mud and Salt Sloughs. 
161. INLAND SURFACE WATERS PLAN, supra note 44.
162. Clean Water Act § 303(d); CAL. WATER CODE § 13263(a).
163. See Clean Water Act § 303(d)(l)(C) & (4). 
164. INLAND SURFACE WATERS PLAN, supra note 44, at 6.
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for the primary purpose of conveying or holding agricultural drainage and were 
not natural water bodies which supported aquatic habitat beneficial uses."165 For 
point source dischargers into Category B watercourses, the State Board ordered 
the Regional Boards to incorporate the numerical ambient water quality 
objectives into the existing WDRs. Thus, each permit will be amended to ensure 
that the aggregate TMDLs for each watercourse are not exceeded.166 For 
nonpoint sources, however, the SWRCB took a different approach. Instead of 
creating a permit system for agricultural drainage and other nonpoint source 
discharges, it directed the Regional Boards to implement the ambient water 
quality standards through the use of "performance goals." The State Board then 
defined performances goals for nonpoint sources by reference to its existing 
plan for nonpoint source management that it adopted in accordance with 
section 319 if the CWA.167 
The "Nonpoint Source Management Plan" is a three-step process for 
regulating agricultural drainage. First, farmers and other sources are given the 
opportunity to devise and to adopt BMPs to reduce the amount of irrigation 
return flow. Second, if these "voluntary" practices do not achieve the TMDLs 
necessary to comply with the ambient water quality standards, or if there is 
insufficient response, the Regional Boards shall "encourage" the adoption of 
BMPs by threatening to impose WDRs on individual sources. Third, if drainage 
is still not reduced to the levels required to achieve the ambient water quality 
standards, the Regional Boards have authority to issue WDRs that "establish 
effluent limitations or discharge prohibitions."168 The SWRCB also set out a 
timetable for implementation of this nonpoint source management program.169 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 7. 
167. Clean Water Act § 319. 
168. INLAND SURFACE WATER PLAN, supra note 44, at 22.
169. Id. at 22-23. EPA had disapproved portions of the Inland Surface Waters Plan. The
vetoed portions include: (1) the State Board’s deferral of immediate protection under the 
numerical ambient water quality standards for water bodies in all three categories established by 
the Plan; and (2) its decision to exempt all watercourses in Category C from the numerical water 
quality standards. EPA acknowledged that 
[f]or those constructed drains that are not “waters of the United States” [and 
therefore not governed by the Clean Water Act], we can appreciate the State 
Board’s desire to exempt them from the Clean Water Act regulations. 
Nevertheless, the State Board’s exemption from category (c) water bodies is 
drafted so broadly and imprecisely that it could be interpreted as apply to certain 
constructed drains that are clearly conveying waters of the United States. 
Accordingly, we disapprove the blanket exemption for category (c) water bodies 
contained in the Plans. 
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The authority of the State and Regional Boards to impose WDRs on dischargers 
of irrigation return flows—that is, to treat nonpoint sources as though they were point 
sources—was confirmed by the landmark decision in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. 
State Water Resources Control Board.170 In that case, the Court of Appeal upheld the Lake 
Tahoe Basin Water Quality Plan, which requires the use of WDRs to regulate nonpoint 
source pollution from residential and commercial development around the lake. The 
SWRCB adopted its permit-based pollution control strategy after concluding that the 
conventional methods of addressing nonpoint source pollution—in this case through 
ambient water quality standards promulgated by the Lahontan Regional Water 
Quality Control Board and land use regulations issued by the United States Forest 
Service and the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency—had failed to prevent erosion of the 
surrounding land and sedimentation of the lake.171 As the Court explained, "surface 
runoff of water carrying soils into the lake is the principal source of pollutants which 
induce the growth of algae into the lake."172 In turn, the algae impairs both the quality 
and the exceptional clarity of Lake Tahoe. "If the trend continues, the lake's translucent 
blue color will be altered."173 
In sustaining the Plan, the Court of Appeal denied the claims of 
developers (who were made subject to the WDRs) that the State Board 
exceeded its statutory authority to regulate nonpoint sources. The plaintiffs 
contended that two provisions of the Porter-Cologne Act required the Board to 
adhere to the federal law of nonpoint source pollution control, which would 
preclude the imposition of permit requirements on the developers' land use 
activities and the consequent surface water runoff. First, section 13373 of the 
Water Code states that "'point sources as used in this chapter shall have the 
same meaning as in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and acts 
amendatory thereof or supplementary thereto."174 Second, section 13374 defines 
"waste discharger requirements" as the "equivalent of the term 'permits' as used 
in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended."175 In turn, the CWA 
categorically excludes "return flows from irrigated agriculture" from the 
definition of point sources176 and prohibits EPA from requiring an NPDES permit 
   Letter from Daniel W. McGovern, Regional Administrator of the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency to W. Don Maughn, Chairman of the California State Water 
Resources Control Board 5-6 (Nov. 6, 1991). 
170. 210 Cal. App. 1421 (1989) (hereinafter “Sierra Preservation Council”). 
171. Id. at 1427-29. 
172. Id. at 1427. 
173. Id. 
174. CAL. WATER CODE § 13373 (West 1992).
175. CAL. WATER CODE § 13374 (West 1992).
176. Clean Water Act § 502(14). 
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"for discharges composed entirely from irrigated agriculture."177 The Plaintiffs 
argued that, since erosion caused by development is treated as nonpoint source 
pollution under federal law, and because "under the federal act federal permits 
are not used for regulation of nonpoint sources of pollution," California may not 
require WDRs "by resort to its own authority."178 
The Court rejected this argument on grounds that now support the 
imposition of WDRs on all nonpoint sources of water pollution, including 
agricultural dischargers. It held that the Porter-Cologne Act requires equivalency 
with federal law "only for purposes of state compliance with the minimum 
requirements of the federal mandate. The federal law does not preclude the 
state from utilizing its broader authority to regulate nonpoint sources of 
pollution by means of its waste discharge permit system."179 Indeed, the Court 
concluded, federal law mandates state regulation of nonpoint sources by means of 
the state's choosing.180 Thus, the exception of nonpoint sources from the NPDES 
system as directed by federal law does not preclude permit-based regulation of 
nonpoint sources under California law. The federal definition of point sources—
including its categorical exclusion of return flows from irrigated agriculture—is 
simply irrelevant to the administration of California's water quality laws. 
In light of the successful defines of WDRs for nonpoint sources in Tahoe-
Sierra Perversion Council, it is surprising that the SWRCB chose to back away from 
permit-based regulation of agricultural dischargers in the Inland Surface Waters 
Plan and to continue to rely primarily on the use of "voluntary" and 
"encouraged" BMPs to meet ambient water quality goals for California's other 
streams, rivers, and lakes. This "preferred" approach has failed in the Grasslands 
region and other parts of the San Joaquin Valley for several reasons. First, BMPs 
(voluntary or otherwise) can be expensive and generally do not afford farmers 
any flexibility to comply in a least-cost manner or in an alternative way that is 
better tailored to individual circumstances. Second, without certain economic or 
regulatory inducements, farmers are unlikely to make the investments in water 
conservation and drainage reduction necessary to comply with the BMPs. Third, 
the requisite regulatory certainty is lacking in a setting in which a single 
administrative agency must deal with thousands of individual sources. The 
Regional Board simply does not have the resources to enforce the BMPs against 
all of the farmers who contribute to the drainage problem in the Grasslands 
region and other parts of the San Joaquin Valley. Nor will it be able to set 
effluent limitations in the form of WDRs for the thousands of individual sources 
of irrigation return flow. 
177. Id. § 402(l) (Section 402(l) also states that the Administrator may not
“directly or indirectly require any State to require such a permit.”). 
178. Sierra Preservation Council, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 1430. 
179. Id. at 1431 (emphasis in original).
180. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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In short, the "preferred" regulatory approach established the SWRCB is 
unlikely to succeed both because the sources of pollution are not individually 
responsible for their actions and because it will be difficult (if not impossible) 
for the RWQCB to ensure that collectively they do not exceed the TMDL for 
selenium that is established for the region. What is needed in place of the 
Inland Surface Waters Plan strategy is a regulatory regime that addresses the 
drainage problem on a regional level, holds the sources of the drainage 
accountable or the external costs of their practices, and gives the sources a 
modicum of economic and farm management flexibility to comply with their 
legal duties in ways that minimize the costs of moving from an unregulated 
environment to a managed drainage basin. 
B. Establishment of a Regional Drainage District
The vexing problem of nonpoint source pollution in the San Joaquin 
Valley is attributable in large measure to institutional distance—specifically, the 
regulatory gap between the ambient water quality standards for selenium and 
other pollutants in the San Joaquin River system and the individual sources of 
those pollutants at the farm level. In the Grasslands region, however, it is not 
necessary to attempt the Herculean task of translating an ambient water quality 
standard (or an aggregate TMDL) into BMPs or WDRs for thousands of 
individual sources. Rather, in the Grasslands region (and, indeed, throughout 
the San Joaquin Valley), the water agencies and drainage districts that serve the 
framers could play a significant role in bridging the regulatory gap. As described 
in Part III, although it is prohibitively expensive today to measure the irrigation 
tailwater generated by each individual farm in the Grasslands region, the 
contribution of each agency that provides drainage service to the farms can be 
calculated. And, because there are only fourteen drainage agencies in the 
region, it would not be administratively impracticable for the Regional Board to 
hold the agencies individually responsible for meeting the collective TMDL for 
discharges from the Grasslands region into the San Joaquin River. 
Once the decision was made to regulate at the agency level, the RWQCB 
would have two options. It could simply assign TMDLs to each of the individual 
agencies. This option would require the Regional Board to establish separate 
effluent limitations for each agency or for each location at which the agency's 
drainage enters a conduit in which it could be accurately measured. The Board 
then would be responsible for monitoring and enforcing these limitations against 
each agency. Alternatively, the RWQCB could focus its standard-setting, 
monitoring, and enforcement efforts on the resource it is charged with protecting. 
Under this approach, the Board would set a single TMDL for selenium entering 
the San Joaquin River system from the combined points of discharge within the 
Grasslands region. The Board would then defer to the local agencies' 
determination of how to apportion the limitation on drainage required by the 
TMDL among themselves and their members. The Regional Board would be 
responsible for monitoring and enforcing the aggregate TMDL for the Grasslands 
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region, but would (initially, at least) look to the local agencies to enforce the 
individual drainage limitations among themselves and their members. 
Either option would offer an improvement over the current situation in 
which the water quality standards for the San Joaquin River are effectively 
unenforceable because of the vast number of sources of subsurface drainage. 
The RWQCB would have a better chance of implementing the standards simply 
because it would have a manageable number of entities to regulate. From the 
perspective of the Board, the second option offers the advantage of enabling it 
to focus on a single entity—the collective of Grasslands area water supply and 
drainage agencies—that would be responsible for complying with the TMDLs 
set by the Board to achieve the ambient water quality standards. 
Under both options, the farmers and other water users within the region 
who are required to reduce their generation of pollution to meet the TMDLs 
would be accountable to the same water managers with whom they work on a 
daily basis, as well as to one another, through the local agencies regulated by the 
Regional Board. From the water users' vantage point, the second option afford an 
additional, significant benefit: By designating a single entity to be responsible to 
the RWQCB for the Grasslands region's aggregate discharge of drainage water in 
the San Joaquin Rover system, there would exist a forum in which the producers of 
the drainage could buy and sell discharge allowance as a means of meeting their 
individual regulatory obligations in a flexible, least-cost manner. 
The best means of creating a single regional entity that would be 
responsible to the RWQCB for the aggregate discharge of pollution from the 
Grasslands region would be through the formation of a Regional Drainage 
District. Indeed, both the Basin Plan and the Inland Surface Waters Plan identify 
the formation of a Regional Drainage district as one means of coming to grips 
with the problem of nonpoint source pollution in the San Joaquin Valley.181 
Moreover, the creation of a Regional Drainage district is a condition for the 
proposed plan by the Grasslands water districts to collect and convey drainage 
from the region into the San Luis Drain for discharge into the San Joaquin River 
downstream of the Merced,182 and it is stipulated as a criterion for 
implementation of federal water conservation requirements.183 
1. The Role and Authority of a Regional Drainage District
In the regulatory framework proposed here, the Regional Drainage District 
would provide the institutional capacity to address the drainage problem on a regional 
181. BASIN PLAN, supra note 152, at IV-16; INLAND SURFACE WATERS PLAN, supra note 44, at 22. 
182. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, MID-PACIFIC REGION, FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT AND 
PROPOSED USE AGREEMENT ALLOWING USE OF THE SAN LUIS DRAIN FOR CONVEYANCE OF AGRICULTURAL 
DRAINAGE WATER THROUGH THE GRASSLANDS WATER DISTRICT AND ADJACENT GRASSLAND CHANNELS. (1991). 
183. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, MID-PACIFIC REGION, GUIDEBOOK FOR PREPARING 
WATER CONSERVATION PLANS (1993). 
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level. This entity would hold the sources of the drainage discharges (districts and the 
farmers within each district) accountable for the environmental costs of their practices, 
while at the same time giving them flexibility to decide how to comply with load 
reduction requirements in ways that minimize the costs of moving from an 
unregulated environment to a regulated one. 
To this end, the Regional Drainage District would have three essential 
duties. First, it would be responsible to the RWQCB for compliance with the 
ambient water quality standards and pollution load limits for the San Joaquin 
River. The RWQCB would assign to the Regional Drainage District a single WDR 
for the drainage discharged from all of the districts (and therefore farms) in the 
Grasslands region that currently discharge into the river.184 This drainage permit 
would be similar to WDRs for point sources and would specify permissible 
pollutant loads for different water-year types and different seasonal flow 
conditions.185 The RWQCB would retain its existing authority to monitor all 
effluent discharges from the Grasslands region and to enforce the terms of the 
WDR against the Regional Drainage District through cease and desist orders, 
fines, civil penalties, injunctive relief, and other remedies.186 The RWQCB also 
would retain the option of issuing permits to individual districts and farmers. 
Second, the Regional Drainage District would have authority to allocate the 
regional allowable pollution load among its member districts and to ensure that 
each district complies with its assigned load allocation. The Regional Drainage 
District would have primary responsibility for monitoring and enforcement vis-à-vis 
the member agencies.187 As a default, the RWQCB would retain its existing power to 
take action against the districts (or, if necessary, against individual farmers) to 
enforce the water discharge requirements for the Grasslands region. 
Third, the Regional Drainage District would be charged with administering 
the system of tradable discharge permits or another district-level regulatory 
program approved by the RWQCB. If a program of tradable permits were chosen, 
the Regional Drainage District would supervise and facilitate trades to ensure 
that, following the transactions, the parties did not exceed their respective 
discharge entitlements. The Regional District also could serve as a 
clearinghouse for relevant information about the market, such as the name of 
sellers and potential purchasers, prices, quantities of the offers and the 
requests, and predicted variations on the aggregate WDR applicable to the 
Grasslands region as a whole.188 
184. Unincorporated irrigated lands that are not within the boundaries of a water district 
would be included within the jurisdictional boundaries of the Regional Drainage District. 
185. See discussion supra Part III.
186. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13300-13361 (West 1992 & 1995 Supp.).
187. The owners and operators of farms on unincorporated lands that are not within 
the boundaries of a water district would be assigned individual load allocations or permits. 
188. If a different regulatory approach were chosen, the Regional Drainage District would
perform a comparable administrative role. For instance, it would set, collect, and adjust effluent and 
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To accomplish these duties. A Regional Drainage District would need the 
following powers: 
• jurisdiction over all of the land and over the local agencies that
supply water and provide drainage services to the Grasslands area;
• authority to represent the agencies and the farmers and other users in
the Grasslands region to the RWQCB, the State Board, the EPA, and
other relevant state and federal regulator agencies, as well as in court; 
• power to assign drainage discharge allocations to each member agency; 
• authority to monitor and to evaluate irrigation practices and drainage
management and discharges in all conveyance facilities in the
Grasslands region and to monitor discharges from each member agency; 
• authority to construct and operate regional drainage collection,
storage, treatment, or disposal facilities based on fees collected from
member agencies;
• enforcement power (including power to levy fees or assessments)
over member agencies and individual farmers to ensure compliance
with effluent limits set forth in their drainage discharge allocations;
• responsibility for administering requirements of a given regulatory
program at the district or farm levels;
• ability to provide technical and financial assistance to member agencies and 
to individual farmers to assist them in meeting the drainage reduction
requirements set forth in their drainage discharge allocations; and 
• contracting authority with other entities including neighboring water districts. 
2. Implementation Options
There are two ways to establish a new regional entity with these powers. 
Either the array of existing local agencies could establish the Regional Drainage 
District through a joint powers agreement, or a new entity could be established 
by legislation. Fourteen local agencies currently provide drainage services within 
the Grasslands region, and twelve agencies supply water to Grasslands area 
farmers and other water users. Six of these agencies engage in both water 
input fees; monitor implementation of BMPs; or monitor compliance with traditional discharge 
permits. Similarly, if the chosen regulatory approach were to involve farm-level regulation based on a 
farm-level allocation of the allowable regional pollution load, see supra Part III, the Regional Drainage 
District would work with member agencies to establish load limits, oversee compliance with 
regulatory requirements, and monitor discharges. Direct farm-level monitoring of drainage 
discharges could be achieved through installation of additional drains, flow-meters, etc. 
Alternatively, a calculation based on water inputs could be used as a surrogate for individual farm 
discharge levels. 
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supply and drainage. These entities are listed in Table 11189 and are shown in 
Figure 1. 
As Table 11 indicates, an organizational analysis of the Grasslands region 
is a complex task. Not only do several water districts provide both water and 
drainage services to their members, but a number of agencies also have 
overlapping jurisdictions. For example, the Central California Irrigation District 
(hereinafter "CCID") is divided into several subareas within the Grasslands 
region, and the lands to which it delivers water are drained by six different 
drainage districts. The Charleston Drainage District services both CCID and the 
San Luis Water District. And the Panoche Drainage District includes four water 
districts. Moreover, the presence of four different types of water agencies—
California water districts, irrigation districts, drainage districts, and mutual 
water companies—means that water supply to and drainage from the 
Grasslands area is governed by the four separate statutes that authorize the 
creation and operation of these separate agencies. 
This complex array of local water agencies has little relation to hydrology 
or efficient resource management. Rather, the existence of twenty agencies to 
serve the Grasslands region can be explained only by history.190 Much of the 
189. Omitted from this list is the Westlands Water District, a portion of which is
located in the Grasslands region. 
190. The drainage districts were formed originally to drain wetlands in the area to enable 
the land to be farmed. Later, these same districts began to provide drainage services to their 
members, carrying excess irrigation water off the farmlands and into the drainage systems. The 
irrigation and water districts were created to distribute water that previously had been control by 
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organizational complexity of the Grasslands region may be put aside, however, 
in favor of one essential point: All of the agencies have the existing authority to 
take the actions needed to manage drainage and water supplies on a regional, 
collective basis to ensure that aggregate discharges to the San Joaquin River do 
not violate either the ambient water quality standards or the load allocations 
established by the RWQCB. Consequently, the Grasslands agencies may enter 
into a joint powers agreement to form a Regional Drainage District.191 
a. Joint Powers Agreement
The twenty agencies that compromise the Grasslands region individually 
have the authorities necessary for an effective regional drainage institution. 
Each is authorized to enter into contracts with other agencies to carry out its 
functions, including the provision of drainage services to its members.192 While 
the concept of assigning load allocations and administering regulatory 
programs for drainage reduction may be new, each agency has the power to 
perform all acts necessary to fulfill its other statutory duties.193 This broad 
functional authority should enable the agencies to devise innovative means of 
the Miller and Lux Corporation and to bring additional water supplies into the Grasslands area. 
Later, a number of these agencies contracted with the CVP to purchase water from the Delta-
Mendota Canal and the San Luis Reservoir, and some began to provide drainage along with 
water service. See N.D. COONTZ, AGRICULTURAL DRAINWATER MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS IN THE
DRAINAGE PROBLEM AREA OF THE SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY (1989) (giving a detailed description and history 
of the local water supply and drainage agencies in the Grasslands area). 
191. Public agencies are permitted to “jointly exercise any power common to the
contracting parties” (CAL. GOVT. CODE  § 6502 (West Supp. 1995)). The joint powers agreement 
may created a new entity, “which is separate from the parties to the agreement and [which] is 
responsible for the administration of the agreement.” CAL. GOVT. CODE § 6503.5 (West 1980). 
The joint powers agency may exercise the authority conferred upon it by the parties over the 
geographical area that represents their common interests. CAL. GOVT. CODE § 6502 (West Supp. 
1995). Thus, although each participating agency may not expand the types of powers beyond 
those that it shares with the other contracting agencies, it may expand the geographic scope of 
those powers beyond its individual service area to include the area in which the common 
interests of the parties are affected. In this case, the joint powers agreement would apply to the 
entire Grasslands region. 
192. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 35850 & 35850.5 (West 1984) (California Water
Districts); CAL. WATER CODE § 22230 (West 1984) (Irrigation Districts); CAL WATER CODE 
APP. § 8-14 (West. Supp. 1995) (Drainage Districts); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2725 (West 
1975) (Mutual Water Companies). 
193. CAL. WATER CODE § 35400 1984) (California Water Districts); CAL. WATER CODE 
§ 22225 (West 1984) (Irrigation Districts); CAL WATER CODE APP. § 8-14 (West. Supp.
1995) (Drainage Districts); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2725 (West 1975) (Mutual Water
Companies). 
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providing drainage services in a manner that complies with applicable state and 
federal water quality laws. Inasmuch as economic incentives generally, and 
tradable discharge permits specifically, are reasonable means of fulfilling this 
objective, all of the Grasslands agencies that provide drainage services to their 
members have the authority to implement such programs. 
The agencies currently measure and monitor the drainage generated by 
farmers within their service areas and report those data to RWQCB.194 They also 
have the power to promulgate rules and regulations governing water 
distribution and use (including subsurface drainage and surface return flows).195 
Pursuant to this authority, some of the agencies in the Grasslands region have 
adopted tiered water pricing as an incentive to increase water conservation by 
their members. Others have adopted drainage fees as well.196 
The enforcement authority of the agencies is limited, however. The 
authorizing legislation for existing districts does not explicitly grant them 
authority to enforce compliance with water quality standards and 
implementation measures. California water districts and irrigation districts may 
levy nominal fines for violations of agency bylaws,197 and they have some 
authority to withhold water or drainage services for failure to pay service 
chargers or for inadequate maintenance of irrigation and conveyance facilities.198 
The enforcement powers of the drainage districts are less certain, however. 
Although these agencies do not have express statutory authority to penalize 
members for violations of bylaws or regulations, they do have the ability to 
include in those rules limited sanctions for abuse.199 For mutual water 
companies, the statues are silent on the subject of enforcement powers.200 
While existing agencies lack a full range of enforcement powers, collectively 
they have a variety of authorities that would be sufficient for effectively 
implementing regional water quality standards and individual pollution discharge 
allocations. As described above, water and irrigation districts may condition water 
194. See GRASSLAND 1989 REPORT, supra note 120; GRASSLAND 1990 REPORT, supra
note 120. 
195. CAL. WATER CODE § 35423 (West 1984) (California Water Districts); CAL. 
WATER CODE § 22085 (West 1984) (Irrigation Districts); CAL WATER CODE APP. § 8-14 (West. 
Supp. 1995) (Drainage Districts). 
196. See, e.g., SAN LUIS CANAL COMPANY, DRAINAGE OPERATING PLAN OF 1991 (1990);
CENTRAL CALIFORNIA IRRIGATION DISTRICT, DRAINAGE OPERATION PLANT OF 1992 (1991); 
BROADVIEW WATER DISTRICT, supra note 85. 
197. CAL. WATER CODE § 35304 (West 1984) (California Water Districts); CAL. 
WATER CODE § 22089 (West 1984) (Irrigation Districts). 
198. CAL. WATER CODE § 35423 (West 1984) (California Water Districts); CAL. 
WATER CODE §§ 22083.5 & 22282.1 (West 1984) (Irrigation Districts). 
199. See CAL. WATER CODE APP. § 8-14 (West Supp., 1995). 
200. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 2725-2729 (West 1975 & Supp. 1995).
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and drainage service upon payment of charges or other requirements. They also 
might condition such services on the farmer's implementation of drainage reduction 
measures necessary for achieving compliance with district-level load limits. The 
requisite authority to enforce water pollution control measures therefore could be 
articulated in district-level rules and regulations and incorporated into the authority 
of the joint powers agreement. 
The efficacy of this approach ultimately depends on the district's 
interpretation of their authority and on the cooperation of districts and farmers. 
Water agencies are effectively "pass through" agencies, created to serve member 
farmers who elect the governing board. As public agencies, all of their costs are 
passed along to member farmers. Thus, in practice, the final measure of an 
agency's authority depends in large part on its board's interpretation of its 
mandate as articulated through district policy and regulations. To the extent 
that the elected board does not perceive its authority to include powers of 
enforcement, it is unlikely that those powers would be exercised, even where 
they legitimately could be. By the same token, the member farmers and the 
other districts included in the joint powers agreement must concur and 
cooperate with such an interpretation of district authority. Disagreement about 
the limits of district authority to enforce regulatory requirements against 
individual farmers would undermine the effectiveness and the potential 
authority of the joint powers agreement. 
b. Legislation
Because joint powers authorities can exercise only those powers that are 
common to all parties to the agreement, and because a joint powers agreement 
cannot be used to expand the members' individual powers, it might be 
desirable to create the new Regional Drainage District by legislation. Such 
legislation not only could vest in the Regional District enforcement authority 
that some of the participating agencies currently lack, it also could confer on the 
Regional District the full panoply of enforcement powers required to accomplish 
the task of providing integrated drainage management to the Grasslands region. 
Moreover, a legislative mandate for a Regional Drainage District would be 
consistent with the statutory basis for existing districts. The language of the 
implementing legislation can be written as a blueprint for the authorization of 
other regional entities with similar regulatory and administrative 
responsibilities. A model statute for creation of a Regional Drainage District is 
provided in the Appendix to this Article. 
C. Operation of the Regional Drainage District
As set forth either in a joint powers agreement or in legislation, the 
Regional Drainage District would include all water supply and drainage agencies 
in the Grasslands region that contribute to the aggregate pollution load in the 
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San Joaquin River. Farmers would be members of the Regional Drainage District 
by virtue of their membership in the respective water agencies. 
The Grasslands Regional Drainage District would be administered by a 
board of directors, which would exercise the powers described above. Directors 
would be elected by the member agencies. An important issue is how to 
structure the voting rights of the various agencies. One option would be simply 
to assign one vote to each agency. In view of the differences in size of the 
Grasslands agencies, however, a system of "one agency, one vote" might not 
fairly represent the interest of the water users within the region. Thus, an 
alternative would be to weight each agency's voting power to reflect its relative 
size.201 As with the allocation of the total allowable pollution load for the region, 
this allocation voting power by size could be based on the amount of drainage 
generated by each agency as a percentage of the aggregate drainage produced 
on the Grasslands region, or on the amount of irrigated or drained land within 
each agency as a percentage of the total irrigated or drained land in the region. 
To ensure a diversity of views on the board, it would be appropriate to stipulate 
that no more than one director may come from a single agency. 
The board of directors should be of a manageable size. Five directors 
would meet this criterion and would provide one director for every four of the 
participating agencies. Directors should be elected on staggered terms and 
should serve for no longer than four years. Once elected, the board would 
appoint a chairman or chairwoman, an executive officer, a financial officer, a 
chief counsel, and other necessary officers and employees. The executive officer 
would be principally responsible for the day-to-day administration of the 
Regional District, for ensuring that the district complies with its drainage 
discharge requirements, for monitoring and enforcing the individual discharge 
allocations held by the member agencies, and for overseeing and facilitating 
regulatory measures taken by member agencies and, as necessary, by individual 
201. The constitutionality of deviating from the general principal of “one person,
one vote” and of weighting voting power over the administration of local water 
agencies is now well-established. In Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981), the Supreme 
Court upheld an Arizona state statute that (1) limits the right to vote in the election of 
the board of directors of a water reclamation district to the owners of the land within 
the district, and (2) apportions voting power according to the amount of land held by 
each voter. Earlier, in Sayler Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, 410, 
U.S. 719 (1973), the Court ruled that a California law that limits the franchise to 
landowners and which apportions voting power according to the assessed valuation of 
the property does not violate the equal protection rights of district residents who do 
not own land. Under the California Constitution, however, a restriction that makes only 
lands owners eligible to serve as members of the board of directors would be 
unconstitutional. Choudhry v. Free, 17 Cal. 3d 660 (1976). 
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farmers. These, and other organizational issues, would be spelled out in the 
governing by-laws for the district.202 
In carrying out its duties, the Regional Drainage District would have 
different responsibilities in relation to member water and drainage districts and 
to entities outside of the Regional District. Under a tradable permit program, for 
example, where all permit holders are members of the Regional Drainage 
District, the Regional District would service as the primary regulatory link 
between the regulated community (i.e., districts and farmers received an initial 
allocation) and the RWQCB. If permit trades involve other entities that are not 
members of the Regional Drainage District, the enforcement authority of the 
Regional District vis-à-vis non-member agencies would be limited. This problem 
could be addressed by having the RWQCB issue a separate discharge permit to 
any non-member agency whose drainage flows into the Grasslands area. In that 
case, the Regional Drainage District and its individual members would have the 
opportunity to participate in the hearings conducted by the RWQCB on these 
discharge permits. If a non-member agency exceeded the discharge allowance 
set forth in its permit, the Regional Drainage District would be able to petition 
the RWQCB to take enforcement action against the non-member agency.203 
The success of any program to regulate agricultural drainage requires 
unambiguous lines of authority between the responsible regulatory agency and 
the individual dischargers. Existing or new institutions can be employed to this 
end. In the Grasslands, however, the need for accountability would best be 
satisfied at the regional level through a regional entity such as a Regional 
Drainage District. Such an intermediate entity would serve the critical function 
of closing the regulatory "gap" between regulators and a large number of small, 
variable pollution sources that comprise the nonpoint source pollution 
202. An example of how such organization issues might be articulated is
provided by The San Luis-Delta Mendota Water Authority, a Joint Exercise of Powers 
Agreement among the water agencies with receive water supplies from and are 
otherwise served by the facilities of the federal CVP. The Agreement spells out the 
purposes, powers, organization, financing, accounting, property rights, liability, and 
terms of termination for the Agreement. SAN LUIS AND DELTA MENDOTA WATER AUTHORITY, 
AMENDED AND RESTATED JOINT EXERCISE OF POWERS AGREEMENT (1992). 
203. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13300-13361 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995). If no
Regional Drainage District is formed, a system of tradable permits (or other regulatory 
program) could be implemented by the RWQCB. The RWQCB could issue individual 
permits to districts and to individual farmers or groups of farmers in unincorporated 
areas, as necessary. The districts would retain primary responsibility for implementing 
programs to effect farm-level drainage reduction sufficient to comply with permit 
limits. Although the enforcement authority of some districts is limited, all of the 
existing water supply and drainage districts in the Grasslands region have the authority 
to control aggregate drainage discharges through price incentives such as tiered water 
rates and drainage service. 
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problem. The Regional Drainage District also would enable an integrated basin-
wide approach to pollution control, consistent with the environmental and 
operation boundaries of the pollution problem. 
VI. A PROPOSED REGULATORY SYSTEM FOR THE GRASSLANDS
The proposed regulatory program for the Grasslands region is a two-tiered 
system that combines tradable discharge permits at the district level with tiered water 
pricing within districts. Combination of the two incentive-based approaches 
establishes accountability for pollution control at the farm level, where most drainage 
reduction must occur, and optimally satisfies the criteria for an effective pollution 
control program. As a result, the system responds to the principal concerns of the 
major affected interests while meeting the environmental objective. 
A. The Role of the Regulatory Agency
Under the proposed system, the RWQCB would initiate the program by 
specifying the TMDL for selenium in the San Joaquin River. The screening-level 
TMDL presented in Part III can be used for this purpose. The allowable monthly 
loads for different types of water years and for different irrigation season presented 
in Part III underscore the undisputed need for significant reductions in pollution 
loads compared to historical discharge levels. While the allowable loads might be 
refined in the future (using improved predictions of river flow changes and water 
diversions), any substantial increases in calculated allowable loads will depend on 
information that is not available in the short term. In any case, the TMDL 
calculations provide a reliable basis for establishing pollution reduction goals. To 
implement the proposed program, however, the RWQCB might adopt interim 
drainage reduction goals based on a more lenient excursion rate as part of a 
compliance schedule. The TMDL model used for the San Joaquin River is designed 
to allow calculations for such alternative scenarios. 
With the pollution load objectives determined, the RWQCB would issue one 
waste discharge requirement for the agricultural community's share of the allowable 
load. This area permit would be assigned to a Regional Drainage District. In the 
absence of a Regional Drainage District, the RWQCB would assign individual 
permits to each of the water districts in the region under the same authority. 
The RWQCB would retain the authority to establish water quality goals. At 
the same time, its administrative and enforcement requirements would be 
streamlined by reducing the number of permitted dischargers to one. Limitation 
of the number on individual sources that must be directly monitored and 
enforced also would minimize the potential for litigation or implementation 
delays and increase the likelihood that environmental goals will be achieved. 
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B. The Role of the Regional Drainage District
The Regional Drainage District would assume responsibility for meeting the 
discharge limits specified by the waste discharge requirement and for implementing 
the measures and programs necessary to do so. One task would be to administer 
the tradable discharge permit program. In this capacity, the Regional Drainage 
District would determine the initial allocation of the total allowable pollution load 
among the contributing water and drainage districts. Leaving this allocation to a 
locally controlled entity would ensure that equity concerns among neighboring 
districts are addressed. Options for allocating the total allowable pollution load 
among the districts include an allocation based on historical discharge levels, 
irrigated acreage, drained acreage, or some weighted average of these factors. The 
equity implications of alternative allocation methods for the individual districts are 
significant, as demonstrated in Tables 4 through 7. 
The trading program would provide an additional opportunity to adjust 
load allocations. Through permit trades, districts could achieve a cost-effective 
distribution of pollution control responsibility, which may change from year to 
year, and resolve remaining equity disparities. The Regional Drainage District 
would assist member districts by identifying potential trades, recording 
transactions, and enforcing permit limits. 
The district-level allocation, formalized by permits assigned to individual 
districts, would stipulate allowable discharge levels for different months and water-
year types, consistent with the TMDL and the waste discharge requirement issued to 
the Regional Drainage District. To meet the needs of the agricultural community for 
predictability in planning irrigation improvements and negotiating permit 
transactions, the allocations could be implemented using an "episode" permit 
system which assigns priorities to discharge permits. Priority 1 permits would 
correspond to the critical-year allocation and represent discharges that could occur 
on an uninterrupted basis during the appropriate month, regardless of year-type 
changes. Priority 2 and 3 permits would correspond to additional discharges that 
could occur only during more favorable hydrological conditions—i.e., dry/below-
normal years and above-normal/wet years, respectively. 
The rules for trading would conform to the temporal limits on discharges. 
Given the monthly and yearly variations in the dilution capacity in the San 
Joaquin River, trades across months and years would be prohibited. For 
example, an April allocation could not be traded and used for a July discharge; 
nor could an allocation for July of one year be saved or traded to allow 
additional discharges in July of a later year.204 If the total allowable load for 
204. Many advocates of tradable permit systems ague that the ability to “bank”
permits for future use is a necessary condition for an efficient permit market. See, e.g., 
HAHN & NOLL, YEAR 2000, supra note 39. In the case of the San Joaquin River and other 
western rivers, the preservation of water quality cannot be ensured where discharge 
permits can be “banked” for future use. 
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different year types and seasons is known well in advance, this restriction on 
banking or storing permits should not inhibit market activity. 
Allocations could be traded either for a limited period, after which the 
allocation would revert to the original holder (a permit lease) or could be 
traded in perpetuity (a fee simple purchase). The proportion of leasing 
transactions relative to fee purchases would likely be higher in the Grasslands 
region than in areas where the allocations remain constant over time. 
C. The Role of Water Districts and Farmers
Under the system of tradable permits, each district world secure the 
appropriate number of permits of each priority designation necessary to 
accommodate its discharges. The highest priority permits (Priority 1) would 
have a greater market value since they would provide for reliable, baseline 
discharges. The quantity of lower priority permits would be determined by the 
district's ability to make short-term adjustments to changes in the total 
allowable load through improved management of existing irrigation systems by 
farmers or through short-term land fallowing. 
To comply with the final discharge allocations, water districts in the 
Grasslands would adopt programs to encourage or to require farmers to 
improve irrigation efficiency and thereby to reduce drainage generation. Water 
districts in the region currently have authority to implement such programs as a 
function of their powers to manage water supply as well as drainage. To 
minimize the costs and the administrative burden to the districts (and, by 
extension, to their member farmers), districts could employ an incentive-based 
program for improving farm-level irrigation efficiency—and one that is 
consistent with the district's existing monitoring and administrative activities. 
Based on these considerations, water districts might elect to adopt a 
system of tiered water prices (block rates in which unit prices for water increase 
with the volume of water purchased) to encourage more efficient use of 
irrigation water supplies and decreased drainage generation by farmers. Tiered 
water pricing would be consistent with existing district practices. Moreover, the 
water management provisions of the Central Valley Project Improvement Act 
require tiered water pricing as a condition of water contract renewals for districts 
receiving federal water supplies, including those in the Grasslands region.205 
Theoretically, water rates could be calculated to reflect estimated avoided 
drainage costs. In practice, because of the limited number of drainage management 
options other than on-farm irrigation efficiency improvements, this would equate to 
a fee that encourages water use consistent with the average per acre drainage 
output necessary for the district to meet its pollution load allocation.206 Because 
205. CVPIA § 3405(d).
206. The importance of farm-level drainage targets is discussed in Part III. 
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water districts are legally prohibited from making a profit on the water they sell to 
farmers, excess revenues might be rebated to farmers on a per acre basis.207 
Alternatively, districts could adopt effluent fees or tradable discharge permit 
programs for farm-level source reduction. Because of the current limited extent of 
subsurface drainage monitoring at the farm level, however, water inputs probably 
would be used as surrogates for discharges under these programs. 
Tiered water prices encourage drainage reduction, but do not assure 
achievement of a specific district pollution load limit. As a consequence, water 
districts probably would use recirculation systems to assure that discharges 
comply with actual permit limits. Over the past several years, many districts have 
constructed systems to capture, blend, and recirculate surface (and in some cases, 
subsurface) drainage to augment irrigation water supplies. This capability would 
be particularly useful on a short-term basis and in critical or dry year conditions, 
when it would allow farmers to produce more than the target level of subsurface 
drainage yet still comply with overall pollution load limits. 
Finally, to enhance source control measures, districts and farmers might 
employ other drainage management techniques for reducing pollution levels. The 
options for improving drainage management in the Grasslands region, as in other 
areas where irrigation drainage poses water quality problems, include selective 
land retirement, treatment and reuse, and water transfers.208 All of these options 
could be implemented within the framework recommended by this study. 
D. Putting Economic Incentives to Work
The incentive-based system proposed for the Grasslands optimally satisfies 
the concerns of both regulators and the regulated farm community, while still 
achieving environmental goals. Specifically, the program is designed to: 
• meet the predetermined allowable pollution load or cap;
• minimize the costs of pollution control to the regulated community;
• accommodate the preference of farmers for flexibility and
independence through a decentralized program;
• address equity concerns of farmers and districts by allowing a locally-
controlled entity to perform the initial allocation of the allowable
pollution load, by allowing subsequent adjustments to the
allocations, and by promoting cost-sharing;
207. See THOMAS & LEIGHTON-SCHWARTZ, supra note 141.
208. DRAINAGE PROGRAM FINAL REPORT, supra note 32; SWRCB REPORT, supra note 31;
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 94; UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA COMMITTEE OF CONSULTANTS ON 
DRAINAGE WATER REDUCTION, OPPORTUNITIES FOR DRAINAGE WATER REDUCTION (1988); UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA COMMITTEE OF CONSULTANTS ON DRAINAGE WATER REDUCTION, ASSOCIATED COSTS OF DRAINAGE 
WATER REDUCTION (1988); UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA COMMITTEE OF CONSULTANTS ON DRAINAGE WATER 
REDUCTION, SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY AGRICULTURE AND RIVER WATER QUALITY (1988). 
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• enable verification of compliance with little change in existing
mentoring systems; and
• impose a few new enforcement or general administrative tasks on
existing agencies and further minimize these by creating a Regional
Drainage District.
The proposed program responds to the two primary constraints imposed 
by the TMDL, or pollution load limit. First, the significance of potential pollution 
control costs, combined with the properties of the pollutant in question, argue 
for a program that neither exceeds nor falls short of the pollution goals by any 
significant margin. In other words, conditions defined by the pollution load 
limits clarify the need for a program design which incorporates a predetermined 
pollution cap while maximizing cost-effectiveness. Both are features of a 
tradable permit program. Second, the program must be amenable to changes in 
the allowable pollution loads and other modifications that arise over the long 
term (as TMDL calculations are revised), without requiring a fundamental 
restructuring of the program design. Again, the tradable permit system, 
combined with farm-level price incentives, meets this need. 
The two-tiered incentive system also accommodates the technical difficulty of 
determining accurate farm-level pollution load allocations. A system that makes 
districts responsible for achieving specific load limits, combined with farm-level 
financial incentives that do not require calculation of precise individual load 
allocations, is preferable. The regulatory approach also tends to ameliorate 
inequities attributed to ground water migration and other physical factors by using 
input fees and by providing a mechanism to adjust discharge allocations. 
Most importantly, the proposed program establishes accountability for 
pollution control at the farm level, where the vast majority of pollution 
reductions must take place, yet does not "tell farmers how to farm." The two-
tiered program relies on strict district-level accountability in exchange for 
greater flexibility at the farm level. Tiered water prices make farmers responsible 
for the pollution they generate but do not deprive them of the opportunity to 
determine the most cost-effective methods of pollution control. This 
arrangement also is consistent with the established roles and responsibilities of 
water districts and their farmers. 
VII. CONCLUSION
The incentive-based, tradable discharge permit system developed in this 
Article provides an opportunity to address the agricultural drainage problem 
that has plagued the Grasslands region and other areas that suffer from 
essentially unregulated nonpoint source pollution. In the first step, the 
pollution reduction goal and an initial allocation of pollution control 
responsibilities are defined. The second-step uses this information to analyze 
various types of programs according to criteria representing the concerns of the 
principal stakeholders, the regulated community, the administrative agencies, 
and the environment. Determination of the advantages and disadvantages of 
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each type of program from these perspectives not only helps to clarify the most 
acceptable approach; it also provides insights about the hybrid systems that 
might be constructed to take maximum advantage of different program 
characteristics. The final step defines any institutional adjustments required to 
implement the preferred program. 
The results of this study also suggest that much of the conventional 
wisdom that has pretermitted consideration of economic incentives for 
addressing nonpoint source pollution problems can be challenged. 
Establishment of accountability—by making dischargers individually 
responsible for the pollution they generate—is central to the success of any 
pollution control program. The first step is to redefine agricultural drainage 
more accurately as "a large collection of independent, monitorable and 
controllable" discharges. This characterization, in turn, provides a point of 
departure for developing an effective regulatory system. Redefinition of the 
pollution problem also underscores the advantages of economic incentive 
programs—viz. flexibility in meeting pollution reduction requirements, 
enhanced accountability for individual sources, and increased likelihood of 
compliance and enforcement. 
Two environmental concerns have inhibited consideration of incentive 
programs and tradable permits in the context of nonpoint source pollution control. 
First is the belief that the use of tradable discharge permits will result in less 
environmental protection than more traditional forms of regulation. This 
presumption is based primarily on proposals that would involve trades between 
point sources (which are subject to specific effluent load limitations) and nonpoint 
sources (which would be subject to BMPs). In this case study, the proposed trading 
system is premised on specific, enforceable load limitations for nonpoint sources—
viz., the Grasslands water and drainage districts. As a result, the trading program 
results in a higher degree of environmental protection than a traditional BMP 
program, without sacrificing cost-effectiveness. To the extent that similar programs 
can be used in other regions, environmental protection can be enhanced by the use 
of tradable permit programs. 
The other environmental concern commonly raised against tradable 
discharge permit programs is that toxic substances should not be traded. There 
are cases where the program boundaries easily can be defined, however, so that 
"toxic hot spots" do not occur, and the ecological effects of the total regional 
pollution load are unaffected by trades within the region. The Grasslands 
example demonstrates that programs can be designed safely to trade toxic 
discharges, provided that appropriate boundaries are drawn and upstream-
downstream trades are weighted correctly. 
Similarly, economic incentives often have been overlooked as a viable option 
where there is a single regulated industry, on the assumption that similarity in 
marginal costs precludes opportunities for significant cost savings compared to 
traditional programs. Although economic data for individual farm sources generally 
are limited, the Grasslands case suggests that cost savings can be realized when small 
marginal cost differences among a large number of sources are aggregated. 
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The technical difficulty of deriving a defensible regional pollution load 
limit (or TMDL) also has inhibited consideration of alternatives to the 
traditional BMP approach. As pointed out in this Article, however, an estimate 
of the regional pollution load allocation (or screening-level TMDL) is a 
prerequisite for designing any effective program. For the San Joaquin River, the 
TMDL provides a simple, affordable, and reliable method by which to calculate 
an initial load allocation among contributing members, and to initiate an 
appropriate nonpoint source control program. 
Economic incentives thus are an important option for controlling 
nonpoint source pollution, particularly in agricultural areas such as the 
Grasslands region. While incentive-based approaches and tradable permit 
systems will not be optimal in every situation, increased knowledge and 
experience with incentive programs will enhance the overall capacity of policy 
makers, regulators, and dischargers to improve and protect water quality. 
APPENDIX 
THE GRASSLANDS REGIONAL DRAINAGE DISTRICT: A MODEL STATUTE 
Section 1: Policy Declarations and Findings 
The Legislature finds and declares as follows: 
a. The Grasslands Region of the San Joaquin Valley is a productive and valuable
component of California's agricultural economy and is home to some of the last 
and most important wetlands in the state. The Grasslands Region also is a
principal source of water supply for the lower reaches of the San Joaquin River. 
b. There exists in the Grasslands Region a serious problem of irrigation
drainage. These problems include:
(1) high levels of groundwater, which can saturate the root zone of the
crops grown in the region;
(2) contaminated irrigation runoff and drainage from farms in the region,
which has caused harm to crops, fish and wildlife, waterfowl, and public 
health, and which has degraded the quality of water in both the San
Joaquin River and the aquifer that underlies the region; and 
(3) the absence of a safe and effective means of disposing of the
agriculture drainage water that is produced by farms in the region.
c. The pollutants in the drainage water that pose the greatest risk to crops,
public health and welfare, fish and wildlife, waterfowl, and water quality
are arsenic, boron, molybdenum, selenium, and other salts.
d. The continued discharge of contaminated drainage water at present
concentrations of pollutants is unacceptable; and past reliance on
nonpoint source pollution controls and ambient water quality standards
to address the problems caused by excessive drainage from the
Grasslands Region are inadequate.
e. Solution of these problems requires:
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(1) integrated, regional management of water use and drainage in the
Grasslands Region;
(2) greater individual accountability among existing water supply and drainage 
agencies for their members' irrigation and drainage practices; and 
(3) creation of a system of tradable discharge permits for the drainage
and pollution generated by irrigation within the region.
Section 2: Membership 
a. The Grasslands Regional Drainage District is comprised of the following
members:
(1) Broadview Water District;
(2) Camp 13 Study Area;
(3) Central California Irrigation District;
(4) Charleston Drainage District;
(5) Dos Palos Drainage District;
(6) Eagle Field Water District;
(7) Firebaugh Canal Water District;
(8) Grasslands Water District;
(9) Gustine Drainage District;
(10) Mercy Springs Water District;
(11) Newman Drainage District;
(12) Oro Loma Water District;
(13) Panoche Drainage District;
(14) Panoche Water District;
(15) Pacheco Drainage District;
(16) Pacheco Water District;
(17) Poso Canal Company;
(18) San Luis Canal Company;
(19) San Luis Water District; and
(20) Widren Water District.
b. With the unanimous consent of the member agencies, other local water or
drainage service agencies may be added to the Grasslands Regional
Drainage District.
Section 3: Board of Directors 
a. The Grasslands Regional Drainage District shall be administered by a
Board of Directors comprised of five representatives of the member
agencies. Each director shall serve for a term of four years, except that in
the first election of directors, the terms shall be staggered as set forth in
section 4.
b. The Board of Directors shall administer the Grasslands Regional Drainage
District and shall have all powers granted to it under this statute.
c. The Board of Directors shall act on the basis of a majority vote of the
directors present and voting at each meeting. Three directors shall
constitute a quorum.
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d. The Board of Directors shall elect a Chair, who shall serve for no longer
than one year.
e. The Board of Directors shall appoint an Executive Officer, and Chief
Financial Officer, a General Counsel, a Chief Engineer, and other
employees. The Board also may retain non-employee consultants to assist
the District with its responsibilities under this statute.
f. The Board of Directors shall meet at least once each quarter. All meetings
shall be conducted in public, except for discussions concerning personnel
and matters protected by the attorney-client privilege.
Section 4: Election of Board of Directors. 
a. Elections for the Board of Directors shall be held once every two years.
b. In the first election, two directors shall be elected for terms of two years,
the other three directors shall be elected for terms of four years. In all
subsequent elections, directors shall be elected for terms of four years.
c. If a vacancy should occur before the end of a term, the remaining directors
shall elect a replacement, who shall serve for the balance of the term.
d. Each member agency may nominate one candidate for election to the
Board of Directors.
e. In the election of directors, each member agency shall vote for one
candidate for each open position on the Board of Directors. The number of
votes cast by each member agency shall be proportionate to the
percentage of irrigated land within the Grasslands Region served by the
agency. For purposes of this section, "irrigated land" includes land served
by irrigation water or drainage for wetlands purposes.
e. No director may serve for a term longer than four years, and no member
agency may have more that one representative on the Board of Directors
at any time.
Section 5: Powers and Responsibilities 
a. The Regional Drainage District shall be responsible to the Central Valley
Regional Water Quality Control Board, the California State Water
Resources Control Board, the United States Environmental Protection
Agency, and all other federal and state agencies with authority over water
quality and natural resources in the San Joaquin Valley for complying with
all laws governing the discharge of drainage and other effluent into the
San Joaquin River and its surface and subsurface tributaries.
b. The Regional Drainage District shall have authority over its member
agencies, and over all uses of water and discharges of drainage that occur
within its member agencies, to ensure that the District and its member
agencies comply with all applicable laws regarding water quality, pollution
control, and natural resources management. This authority shall include
the following:
(1) Based on waste discharge requirements, effluent limitations, or
other water quality standards established under state or federal law,
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the District shall determine the aggregate pollution load for each 
pollutant governed by such law. This aggregate pollution load is the 
maximum amount of each regulated pollutant that may be 
discharged from all sources located within the District into the San 
Joaquin River and its tributaries. The aggregate pollution load may 
be established for any period up to one year. 
(2) The District shall ensure that the aggregate discharge of pollution
from all sources within the District does not exceed the aggregate
pollution load.
(3) The District shall apportion the aggregate pollution load among its
member agencies according to fair and equitable criteria established
by the Board of Directors. In establishing these criteria, the Board of
Directors shall consider:
(a) the total irrigated acreage within each member agency;
(b) the average quantity of drainage produced by each member
agency in the form of surface runoff, return flow, and
percolation following irrigation during the ten years
immediately preceding the apportionment;
(c) the average quantity of water applied for the purpose of
irrigating crops within each member agency during the ten
years immediately preceding the apportionment; and
(d) drainage reduction and management methods that are
applied by, or are potentially applicable to, water supply,
distribution, irrigation, drainage, and other water uses within
each member agency.
 For purposes of this section, "irrigation" and "irrigated land" include 
land served by irrigation water or drainage for wetlands purposes. 
(4) The District shall quantify each member agency's apportionment of
the aggregate pollution load and issue a discharge permit to each
agency based on that apportionment.
(a) The discharge permit for each member agency shall define the
quantity of drainage water that each agency is entitled to
discharge from all sources into the San Joaquin River and its
tributaries, into the groundwater basin, or into any drain or
other conveyance facility that flows into the San Joaquin River
or its tributaries or into the groundwater basin.
(b) The Board of Directors shall issue discharge permits that
define the quantity of drainage water and the quantity of
pollutants that each member agency may discharge over any
period up to one year.
(c) The allowances to discharge drainage water and pollution
established by the discharge permits may be transferred
among member agencies and individual sources of drainage
water and pollution.
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(d) The allowances to discharge drainage water and pollution
established by the discharge permits do not constitute
property protected under the California Constitution, the
United States Constitution, or any other law.
(5) The District shall supervise and manage the transfer of discharge
allowances. No member agency may transfer a discharge allowance
without the prior approval of the Board of Directors. The Board shall
establish criteria to define acceptable trades and to govern its review
transfer proposals.
(6) The District shall monitor and evaluate water supply, irrigation, and
drainage practices within each member agency to ensure that each
agency complies with the terms of its discharge permit.
(7) The District shall collect from each member agency a reasonable fee
to pay for the District's costs of implementing this statute, including
but not limited to the payment of all salaries, administrative
expenses, rent, capital and improvement costs, attorneys' and
consultants' fees, and monitoring and enforcement costs.
(8) The District shall levy fines and other penalties for the violation of
the discharge permits. The Board of Directors shall establish a
hearing procedure to govern the administration of such fines and
penalties and shall promulgate a schedule of fines and penalties
applicable to violation of the discharge permits. The amount of the
fine and the severity of any other penalty shall double with each
successive violation.
(9) The District shall provide technical and financial assistance to
member agencies and to individual water users within the member
agencies to assist them in meeting the drainage reduction
requirements set forth in their discharge permits.
c. The District shall represent its member agencies, and the interests of
water users within the member agencies, before the Central Valley
Regional Water Quality Control Board, the State Water Resources Control
Board, the United States Environmental Protection Agency, and other
relevant state and federal regulatory agencies, as well as in court.
d. Notwithstanding any other provision of this statute, the District shall
comply with all waste discharge requirements, effluent limitations, and
other water quality standards established under state or federal law.
Section 6: Other Authority 
a. The Board of Directors shall have the authority to promulgate regulations
as it deems appropriate to carry out its responsibilities under this statute.
b. The Board of Directors shall have the authority to enter into contracts as
needed to carry out its responsibilities under this statute.
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